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ABSTRACT 
 How can emergency alerts be modified to more effectively serve people with 
functional and access needs? This thesis employed a qualitative analysis of three U.S. and 
two international case studies of disasters, applying the findings to the value proposition 
framework, which considers the warning requirements of people with disabilities or other 
access needs as well as what inclusive warning and notifications systems would look like. 
This framework drove eight recommendations that stakeholders can use to improve such 
systems. Alert originators and professional associations should enhance inclusive 
planning and education and implement broader use of diverse warning systems for public 
safety and the public. They should also leverage assistive technologies and community 
relationships. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology Directorate, respectively, 
should incentivize inclusive warning programs through grant funding and fund 
technology research for resilient warning infrastructure. 
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Emergency management and public safety practitioners cannot foretell the future, 
but they are often the first to know about impending hazards that require a public response 
to ensure safety. Thus, they possess information about present or future hazards that the 
public does not likely have, yet information must be communicated rapidly for it to be 
understood, believed, and acted upon. They also possess the expertise to predict how future 
events might play out if the public does not heed their warnings, based on knowledge of 
the past. Therefore, emergency managers fear—as did Cassandra of Troy—that while they 
can predict disaster outcomes, their warnings might be ignored.1 Public safety and 
emergency management personnel, especially at the local level where disasters begin and 
end, are charged with making split-second decisions to maintain the safety of their 
communities. 
By the end of the second decade of the twenty-first century, the United States had 
greatly improved its capabilities to warn citizens in times of emergency and disasters. 
Federal, state, and local levels of government had all contributed to such improvements. 
One such warning platform is the Integrated Public Alert and Warning System, which 
includes warnings via Wireless Emergency Alerts and the Emergency Alert System 
through numerous communications channels.2 Governmental alerting authorities use the 
system to send emergency messages in text format via cellular networks to individuals 
likely to experience the impact of dangerous situations or disasters.3  
Additionally, many local governments have implemented mass notification 
systems that warn registered users via calls or texts of pending threats or disasters. Despite 
 
1 Encyclopedia Britannica, s.v. “Cassandra,” February 14, 2019, https://www.britannica.com/topic/
Cassandra-Greek-mythology; Shankar Vedantam et al., “Warnings, Warnings Everywhere: Why We 
Sometimes Ignore Looming Disasters,” Hidden Brain, January 20, 2020, https://www.npr.org/2020/01/17/
797357603/the-cassandra-curse-why-we-heed-some-warnings-and-ignore-others. 
2 “IPAWS Architecture,” Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2016, https://web.archive.org/
web/20190506084227/https://www.fema.gov/media-library/assets/documents/113642. 
3 “Wireless Emergency Alerts (WEA),” Federal Communications Commission, December 19, 2019, 
https://www.fcc.gov/consumers/guides/wireless-emergency-alerts-wea. 
xvi 
the widespread use of these advanced systems and others, they do not adequately 
accommodate Americans with functional and access needs, such as the disabled and the 
elderly—a vast segment of the population. Indeed, according to 2010 U.S. Census data, 
roughly 20 percent of the populace has functional needs.4 While this statistic represents a 
large portion of the population, it does not even include people who may have limited or 
no ability to communicate in English, a population that also has difficulty understanding 
alerts. Although designed to save lives, myriad barriers limit the effectiveness of 
emergency alerts for this large segment of the U.S. population. 
A review of the literature suggests that shortfalls remain within the U.S. warning 
systems, gaps that are especially salient for people with functional and access needs. These 
shortcomings, displayed through academic work and cases of real-world incidents, 
represent the motivation of this thesis. Correspondingly, this thesis aims to find actionable 
solutions to improve the status quo of warnings for those who have additional barriers.  
This thesis employs a qualitative analysis of the history of warnings and 
notifications within the United States and three U.S. disaster case studies: the 2017 Oroville 
Dam Evacuation, the 2017 and 2018 California wildfires, and Hurricane Harvey in 2017. 
Additionally, it presents two international warning case studies, reviewing the warning 
methodologies and inclusivity practices of Canada and New Zealand. The U.S. case studies 
identify gaps in public education, outreach, and planning; alert originator education and 
planning; timeliness of warnings, reliance on too few systems; Wireless Emergency Alerts 
(underuse); and limited resilience of current warning infrastructure. The international case 
studies identify the positive practices of accessible public education materials, including 
information on assistive technologies and building neighborhood partnerships, regular 
public tests of warning systems, provision of cell phones to people experiencing indigence 
during COVID-19, and use of non-emergency communication channels to bolster 
messages sent through warning systems. 
 
4 “Nearly 1 in 5 People Have a Disability in the U.S., Census Bureau Reports,” U.S. Census Bureau, 
July 25, 2012, https://www.census.gov/newsroom/releases/archives/miscellaneous/cb12-134.html; Federal 
Emergency Management Agency, Alerting the Whole Community: Removing Barriers to Alerting 
Accessibility (Washington, DC: Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2013), 1, 
https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=738561. 
xvii 
The findings from these case studies are applied to the value proposition 
framework, as developed by Alexander Osterwalder et al., which considers the needs of 
clients within the context of a company’s functions or goods and thereby seeks to add worth 
through meeting those needs.5 The idea behind the value proposition framework, as used 
for this thesis, is to identify the shortcomings of current warning methodologies for people 
with functional and access needs by considering their perspectives after careful analysis of 
real-world incidents. Additionally, this thesis suggests how an inclusive warning program 
might look, and then the value proposition framework drives the recommendations for 
improvement. 
This thesis facilitates future action for the improvement of warnings and alerts  
by grouping recommendations into stakeholder categories, thereby assigning 
recommendations to the organizations best suited to effect change. Local, state, and federal 
alert originators, as well as professional association originators (the first stakeholder 
group), should:  
• Educate constituents on warning systems and plan to meet community-
specific needs. 
• Educate and train alert originators. 
• Use all warning tools available. 
• Leverage assistive technology. 
• Promote know-your-neighbor programs. 
• Regularly and publicly test warning systems. 
The Federal Emergency Management Agency and the Department of Homeland Security’s 
Science and Technology Directorate (the second stakeholder group) should:  
 
5 Alexander Osterwalder et al., Value Proposition Design: How to Create Products and Services 
Customers Want (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Incorporated, 2014), 6–9. 
xviii 
• Incentivize emergency management planning functions with vulnerable 
populations through federal grant funding. 
• Conduct further research into resilient warning infrastructure. 
These recommendations directly address the identified shortcomings from the case studies. 
The year 2020 has illustrated the need for effective warning systems; those in public 
safety and the homeland security enterprise are loath to be like Cassandra—doomed to 
predict a dire future yet to have their warnings go unheeded. If current trends continue, 
there will be no shortage of hazards about which to warn the public. Investments of time, 
energy, and funding are vital in this arena, as such expenditures will pay dividends across 
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Emergency management and public safety practitioners cannot foretell the future, 
but they are often the first to know about impending hazards that require a public response 
to ensure safety. Thus, they have information about present or future hazards the public 
does not likely have, yet information must be communicated rapidly for it to be understood, 
believed, and acted upon. They also possess the expertise—the gift, one might say—to 
predict how future events might play out if the public does not heed their warnings, based 
on knowledge of the past. Therefore, emergency managers fear—as did Cassandra of 
Troy—that while they can predict disaster outcomes, their warnings might be ignored.1  
Public safety and emergency management personnel, especially at the local level, 
where disasters begin and end, are charged with making split-second decisions to maintain 
the safety of their communities. Incident circumstances may dictate that such personnel 
make decisions that affect life safety based on rapidly evolving, incomplete, or conflicting 
information at the least opportune time. Life-safety decision-making at the local level 
includes decisions about if and when to issue warnings and notifications to the public.  
Imagine a small community suddenly faced with a rapidly advancing wildfire, or 
the imminent failure of a large upstream dam, at two o’clock in the morning. Local incident 
commanders immediately call for evacuations of the soon-to-be-devastated areas. Then, 
emergency telecommunications and emergency management personnel must warn the 
public—the whole community—while avoiding Cassandra’s curse. The whole community 
includes people and groups that may have numerous barriers to receiving, understanding, 
and acting upon the warnings. This thesis seeks to guide efforts to mitigate warning barriers 
for people with functional and access needs. 
 
1 Encyclopedia Britannica, s.v. “Cassandra,” February 14, 2019, https://www.britannica.com/topic/
Cassandra-Greek-mythology; Shankar Vedantam et al., “Warnings, Warnings Everywhere: Why We 
Sometimes Ignore Looming Disasters,” Hidden Brain, January 20, 2020, https://www.npr.org/2020/01/17/
797357603/the-cassandra-curse-why-we-heed-some-warnings-and-ignore-others.  
2 
A. RESEARCH QUESTION 
How can emergency alert systems be modified to more effectively serve people 
with functional and access needs?  
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
By the end of the second decade of the twenty-first century, the United States had 
greatly improved its capabilities to warn citizens in times of emergency and disasters. 
Federal, state, and local levels of government had all contributed to such improvements. 
Currently, numerous government agencies at all levels send alerts through different 
systems to inform the public of peril. One such warning platform is the Integrated Public 
Alert and Warning System, which includes warnings via Wireless Emergency Alerts and 
the Emergency Alert System through numerous communications channels.2 Governmental 
alerting authorities use the system to send emergency messages in text format via cellular 
networks to individuals likely to experience the impact of dangerous situations or 
disasters.3 Additionally, many local governments have implemented mass notification 
systems that warn registered users of pending threats or disasters via calls or texts. Despite 
the widespread use of these advanced systems and others, the systems do not adequately 
accommodate Americans with functional and access needs—a vast segment of the 
population. Indeed, according to 2010 U.S. Census data, roughly 20 percent of the populace 
has functional needs.4 While this statistic represents a large portion of the population, it 
does not even include people who may have limited or no ability to communicate in 
English, a population that also has difficulty understanding alerts.  
 
2 “IPAWS Architecture,” Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2016, https://web.archive.org/
web/20190506084227/https://www.fema.gov/media-library/assets/documents/113642. 
3 ““Wireless Emergency Alerts (WEA),” Federal Communications Commission, December 19, 2019, 
https://www.fcc.gov/consumers/guides/wireless-emergency-alerts-wea. 
4 “Nearly 1 in 5 People Have a Disability in the U.S., Census Bureau Reports,” U.S. Census Bureau, 
July 25, 2012, https://www.census.gov/newsroom/releases/archives/miscellaneous/cb12-134.html; Federal 
Emergency Management Agency, Alerting the Whole Community: Removing Barriers to Alerting 
Accessibility (Washington, DC: Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2013), 1, 
https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=738561.  
3 
People with functional and access needs, including those with limited English 
proficiency, experience barriers to emergency alerting for numerous reasons. One reason 
is that many alerts and notifications come from small local government entities, usually 
counties, which can create gaps in effective alerting.5 These local governments typically 
have fewer staff members and less funding than entities at the federal or state level, which 
creates barriers in preparing emergency alerts. Indeed, the National Academies of Sciences, 
Engineering, and Medicine acknowledge the resource and personnel variations among 
alerting authorities.6 According to data collected by the creators of Hyper-Reach, a mass 
notification system, only about one in five counties in the United States had registered to 
use wireless emergency alerts as of 2017, and the counties that had registered used the 
alerts infrequently.7 This situation demonstrates that local entities are not using available 
alerting resources to their full potential, which creates warning shortfalls. 
Furthermore, people with functional and access needs may not have all the same 
resources that are available to the general population during disasters. More specifically, 
emergency notifications may be less effective for these populations as they often lack the 
robust social support of the general population.8 Warning message validation matters 
because, according to Michele Wood et al., “historical research has shown that when 
provided with warning information about an imminent threat, people tend to seek 
additional information and confirm information already received before they act, thus 
‘wasting’ time before initiating a protective action.”9 If people with functional and access 
 
5 “Organizations with Alerting Authority Completed,” Federal Emergency Management Agency, 
December 16, 2019, https://web.archive.org/web/20190401000000*/https://www.fema.gov/media-library/
assets/documents/117152. 
6 National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, Emergency Alert and Warning 
Systems: Current Knowledge and Future Research Directions (Washington, DC: National Academies 
Press, 2018), 74, https://doi.org/10.17226/24935. 
7 “A Closer Look at IPAWS,” Hyper-Reach, December 22, 2017, https://www.hyper-reach.com/lets-
get-more-jurisdictions-on-ipaws/; Hamilton Bean, Mobile Technology and the Transformation of Public 
Alert and Warning (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger Security International, 2019). 
8 National Council on Disability, Effective Communications for People with Disabilities: Before, 
during, and after Emergencies (Washington, DC: National Council on Disability, 2014), 39–40, 
https://rems.ed.gov/docs/Effective%20Communications%20for%20People%20with%20Disabilities.pdf. 
9 Michele M. Wood et al., “Milling and Public Warnings,” Environment and Behavior 50, no. 5 
(2018): 536, https://doi.org/10.1177/0013916517709561. 
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needs are less apt to confirm alerts, then there may be an even greater lag between the time 
the message is received and the time they take action. The National Academies of Sciences, 
Engineering, and Medicine support the idea that the traits of a warning message recipient, 
such as functional or access needs, could affect the time it takes the recipient to adhere to 
the alert.10  
The technology itself can prove problematic as well. For example, another 
hindrance for this population lies in the use of mobile devices, which appear in roughly 
9 percent fewer homes of those with functional and access needs than of the general 
population.11 Thus, people with functional and access needs may receive wireless 
emergency alert messages at a lower rate; even if the alerts are received, they may not be 
as effective in spurring adherence to message instructions. Moreover, while the system can 
send English- and Spanish-language messages, they will be ineffective for many people 
with limited or no proficiency in these languages.12 Furthermore, the utility of the system 
messages is hampered by their largely text-based format, which can be problematic for 
people with vision disabilities.13 These and other barriers matter because they limit the 
effectiveness of emergency alerts—which are designed to save lives—for a large segment 
of the U.S. population. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The most pertinent literature in this area came after approximately 2010, when the 
national dialogue included more on wireless alerts; however, some studies and documents 
published before that time are quite illuminating on the subject. The literature that supports 
 
10 National Academies of Sciences, Emergency Alert and Warning Systems, 37. 
11 John T. Morris and W. Mark Sweatman, “Wireless Device Ownership by People with Disabilities,” 
SUNspot 2016, no. 1 (December 2016): 3; Monica Anderson, “U.S. Technology Device Ownership 2015,” 
Pew Research Center, October 29, 2015, https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2015/10/29/technology-
device-ownership-2015/. 
12 “Just Announced at IAEM: WEA 2.0 & 3.0 Roll Out Date, November 29th,” Federal Emergency 
Management Agency, November 19, 2019, https://content.govdelivery.com/accounts/USDHSFEMA/
bulletins/26cf4aa. 
13 Wireless Inclusive Rehabilitation Engineering Research Center, “FM Radio and RBDS-Based 
Emergency Alerting” (paper brief, Georgia Tech, 2018), 1, http://www.wirelessrerc.gatech.edu/paper-brief-
save-lives-withstand-catastrophe-and-stimulate-marketplace; Federal Emergency Management Agency, 
“WEA 2.0 & 3.0 Roll Out Date.” 
5 
this thesis generally falls into one of three categories: warning and notifications studies and 
documents that focus on the general public but may touch on people with functional and 
access needs, preparedness literature and studies for people with functional and access 
needs, and research that focuses solely on warnings and notifications for the 
aforementioned people who may have additional barriers. The latter category, while 
containing some solid work by a few institutions and individuals, is by far the scarcest of 
the three. The literature is composed primarily of practitioners’ documents, such as best 
practices, reports, lessons learned, academic studies, and scholarly articles. 
1. Definitions 
This thesis uses the term functional and access needs to describe people who may 
have additional barriers in receiving alerts. This includes the elderly, people with limited 
ability to communicate in English, and those with disabilities as defined by the Americans 
with Disabilities Act (ADA). The ADA defines disability as a “physical or mental 
impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities.”14 
Another important definition is that of alert originators. These are government 
entities at the federal, state, or local level that have the authority to send warnings and 
notifications to the public in times of emergency or disaster. This is a term frequently used 
in warning literature and is used interchangeably with alerting authorities. 
This thesis focuses on warnings and alerts and uses Department of Homeland 
Security definitions pertaining to different types of communications, as shown in 
Table 1.15 
 
14 Americans with Disabilities Act, as Amended, 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (2008), https://www.ada.gov/
pubs/adastatute08.htm#12102. 
15 Department of Homeland Security, Public Safety Communications: Ten Keys to Improving 
Emergency Alerts, Warnings & Notifications (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2019), 
1, https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=824825. 
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2. Existing Research 
The broad field of research about emergency alerts and notifications has grown 
even broader within the past decade thanks largely to the advent of Wireless Emergency 
Alerts in 2012.17 The literature recognizes this system as a tremendous step forward for 
notifying the public in times of disaster. As such, there is no robust debate about the value 
of the system; however, there are ongoing discussions about how best to implement this 
system, including how to mitigate current system limitations and potential future upgrades 
to bolster its effectiveness for the whole community.  
This body of literature occasionally references people with functional and access 
needs when discussing the alerting process. The Department of Homeland Security’s 
Office of Cyber and Infrastructure Analysis (CISA) published one such document in 2019, 
and CISA suggests alert originators should be methodical and deliberate in their warning 
planning and implementation processes.18 The organization presents best practices and 
encourages alerting agencies to “consider the use of more dynamic, visual, and spatial 
content, outside of text messages, to reach diverse populations, ensure accessibility, and 
better convey risk.”19 Less than one page of the eighteen18-page document is dedicated to 
 
16 Source: Department of Homeland Security, 1. 
17 Federal Communications Commission, “Wireless Emergency Alerts (WEA).” 
18 Department of Homeland Security, Public Safety Communications. 
19 Department of Homeland Security, 6. 
7 
this subject, and some of the practices identified are incompatible with Wireless 
Emergency Alerts and potentially other local mass notification systems. For example, 
Wireless Emergency Alerts cannot include video, pictures, or voice message components 
as of this writing. Indeed, the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine 
have also weighed in on this subject and found that gaps exist regarding the utility of this 
system for people with functional and access needs.20 Their report highlights the long-term 
alerting goal of “Adapting message content and format to the context and needs of the end 
user—for example, considering location of the device, known home location of the device 
owner, language of the device owner, disability status, and other context (as selected or 
entered by the user).”21 Thus, multiple government sources seem to agree that a nationwide 
alerting system that cannot provide multimedia formats has shortfalls in the context of 
accessibility. 
Dennis Mileti studies this subject and recently contributed to research authored by 
Wood et al.22 The authors explore how the government might exploit these systems to spur 
the public into following warning message guidance as soon as possible.23 The authors 
evaluate ways to reduce public milling or delaying adherence to warning messages by 
reviewing the various ways in which the public perceives and mentally processes such 
messages.24 In identifying areas for future research, they warn that “understanding ways 
to maximize [warning] message impact among disabled and functional limitation 
communities is critical to extending the benefits of warning technology to broader 
society.”25 Furthermore, in a Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) PrepTalk, 
 
20 National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, Emergency Alert and Warning 
Systems, 7. 
21 National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, 9. 
22 Wood et al., “Milling and Public Warnings.” 
23 Wood et al., 535. 
24 Wood et al., 535. 
25 Wood et al., 558. 
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Mileti discusses the importance of alert message crafting and content.26 He drives home 
this point:  
But, what impacts protective action initiation behavior in Americans the 
most? It’s the message contents, it’s the message contents, it’s the message 
contents. Any questions about what the most important factor is? It’s the 
message contents. It’s what the message says and how it says it.27 
A 2014 study by Hamilton Bean et al. reiterates the importance of and nuance in crafting 
actionable warning messages; the study highlights challenges with short-length warning 
language and describes important pieces of information to include in the messages, 
including the order in which they should appear.28 For example, the authors suggest that 
including the name of the agency that sent the alert could help spur the public into heeding 
the short-length message.29Additionally, Bean et al. found that longer warning text (in this 
case, over 1,300 characters) was generally more effective than shorter text in driving public 
response.30 These works demonstrate the high degree of subtlety and nuance involved in 
crafting effective warning messages for the general public. However, as referenced earlier, 
individuals who have functional needs face even greater hurdles when it comes to prompt 
adherence to warning guidance.31 
Much of the current literature on Wireless Emergency Alerts focuses on how best 
to use the system for the general population. In response to the spurious, duress-inducing 
missile alert in 2018 from Hawaii Emergency Management, the Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC) found a “combination of human error and inadequate safeguards 
 
26 “PrepTalks: Dr. Dennis Mileti ‘Modernizing Public Warning Messaging,’” Federal Emergency 
Management Agency, February 14, 2018, https://www.fema.gov/preptalks/mileti. 
27 Federal Emergency Management Agency. 
28 Hamilton Bean et al., Comprehensive Testing of Imminent Threat Public Messages for Mobile 
Devices (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology Directorate, 2014), 
1–2, https://www.dhs.gov/publication/wea-comprehensive-testing-imminent-threat-public-messages-
mobile-devices-updated. 
29 Bean et al., 1. 
30 Bean et al., 2. 
31 National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, Emergency Alert and Warning 
Systems, 37. 
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contributed to the false alert.”32 The commission’s report recommends numerous 
corrective actions to prevent erroneous alerts in the future, such as using accurate language 
in drill messages and confirming the accuracy of alert languages using several staff 
members who are familiar with the system.33 More specifically, the FCC recommends that 
those crafting the messages should “refrain from using phrases such as ‘This is Not a Drill’ 
or ‘Real World’ in test messages. Instead, test messages should be clearly identified  
as tests.”34  
One group of practitioners has explored ways to correct the misuse or underuse of 
such systems. In the context of wildfires, the National Emergency Management 
Association (NEMA) offers some related recommendations, recognizing that the public 
was potentially unsure of what action to take based on common warning messages.35 
NEMA recommends using as many warning channels as possible and encourages “regular 
education and training on use of [warning] technology.”36 The literature provides a 
consensus on the latter point. The Office of Cyber and Infrastructure Analysis highlights 
the importance of training for those sending warnings, and Art Botterell takes it a step 
further by recognizing that there is no credentialing among government warning 
personnel.37  
Some of the contemporary literature looks at warnings within the context of human 
communication and technology. Bean contends that the main problem with wireless 
warning systems is that they do not effectively convey messages to people, whereas, in the 
 
32 Federal Communications Commission, Report and Recommendations: Hawaii Emergency 
Management Agency, January 13, 2018, False Alert (Washington, DC: Federal Communications 
Commission, 2018), 14. 
33 Federal Communications Commission, 24–25. 
34 Federal Communications Commission, 24. 
35 National Emergency Management Association, “NEMA Wildfire Alert & Notification Workshop: 
Summary,” (workshop summary, National Emergency Management Association, April 17, 2019), 6, 
https://www.nemaweb.org/index.php/nema-initatives/wildfire-alert-notification. 
36 National Emergency Management Association, 7. 
37 Department of Homeland Security, Public Safety Communications, 8–9; Bean, Mobile Technology, 
ix. 
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past, problems have primarily been attributed to technology.38 This idea shows that these 
two aspects of alerting are not always given equal consideration by alerting authorities. 
Indeed, Bean later observes, “The United States does not really have a mobile alert and 
warning system problem—it has a public education problem.”39 One technical example is 
the limited message length for Wireless Emergency Alerts. The literature agrees that longer 
warning messages are generally more effective at spurring the public to adhere to their 
directions. Wood et al. support this idea, and Bean et al. acknowledge the limited 
effectiveness of short warning language as well.40 The recent increase from a 90-character 
to 360-character limit within Wireless Emergency Alerts supports this notion.41 The 
technological and human dichotomy of alerts and warnings is also referenced by the 
National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, which posits that experts in 
both areas are needed to study this subject.42 While it may be helpful to analyze problems 
based on this dichotomy, the literature within this category offers limited actionable 
guidance to help warning practitioners effectively alert people who have functional and 
access needs.  
A review of the literature suggests that shortfalls remain within the U.S. warning 
systems—shortfalls that are especially salient for people with functional and access needs. 
These shortcomings, displayed through academic work and cases of real-world incidents, 
are the reasons behind the research question of this thesis. As such, this thesis aims to find 
actionable solutions to improve the status quo of warnings for those who may have 
additional barriers.  
 
38 Bean, Mobile Technology, xxiii. 
39 Bean, 129. 
40 Wood et al., “Milling and Public Warnings,” 1; Bean et al., Comprehensive Testing, 1. 
41 Federal Emergency Management Agency, “WEA 2.0 & 3.0 Roll Out Date.” 
42 National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, Emergency Alert and Warning 
Systems, 9. 
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D. CHAPTER ORGANIZATION 
This thesis contributes, through the lens of a local emergency manager, to the 
ongoing, robust discussion on warnings and notifications by reviewing both sides of the 
alerting equation: requirements for people with functional and access needs, and alerting 
practices of emergency management personnel. In other words, this thesis reviews where 
the United States’ current warnings and notifications methodology falls short on the side 
of alert originators (those sending the alerts) and the alert consumption requirements of 
people with functional and access needs (those receiving the alerts). Ultimately, this thesis 
seeks to achieve balance between these two ends of the warning spectrum by applying the 
value proposition, and then suggests solutions and recommendations. 
Chapter II reviews the history of electronic alerting systems in the United States, 
starting with civil defense–era systems of the Cold War and extending through today’s 
current technology. This chapter also provides background on inclusive alerting. 
Chapter III introduces the U.S. and international case studies for this thesis and the 
framework for their review, the value proposition canvas. Chapter IV reviews the three 
U.S. case studies of disasters from which lessons are drawn within the context of inclusive 
public warnings. Chapter V reviews the two international case studies of inclusive alerting 
practices through recent incidents and public outreach and education materials. Chapter VI 
applies the value proposition to the lessons from the five case studies, and Chapter VII 
synthesizes the findings of this thesis and provides recommendations for improving 
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II. HISTORY OF ALERTS IN THE UNITED STATES 
The history of warning systems in the United States is illustrative of the threats and 
hazards, technology, and governmental objectives of each era. Warning methodologies 
started during the Cold War with rudimentary systems focusing primarily on military and 
some weather concerns and expanded to focus on all hazards through multiple systems, 
with an eye toward greater inclusivity. This chapter reviews that history. 
A. COLD WAR TO PRESENT 
During the height of the Cold War, the United States developed a national system 
for warning the public. However, warnings were not the only objective with the system, 
which was known as CONELRAD. As Susan L. Brinson states: 
Implemented in late 1951, CONELRAD (a contraction of CONtrol of 
ELectromagnetic RADiation) was conceived as a military air defense 
system that eventually attempted to incorporate two fundamental and 
incompatible goals: deny radio transmissions as a navigational aid for 
enemy bombers by taking radio stations off the air, while simultaneously 
using radio stations to communicate critical civil defense information 
during an attack in order to protect the civilian population.43 
Contrastingly, today’s national alerting systems are primarily an operation of civil 
authorities. CONELRAD, a joint effort between the Federal Civil Defense Administration 
(FCDA), the military, and the FCC, witnessed turf battles.44 While the military and FCC 
were keenly focused on denying marauding Soviet bombers any direction-finding 
advantage from radio stations within the United States, the FCDA was focused on 
providing warnings to the public through many of those same radio stations in the event of 
a nuclear attack.45 
 
43 Susan L. Brinson, “CONELRAD on the Front Line of Cold War Defense,” Media, War & Conflict 
2, no. 3 (2009): 340, https://doi.org/10.1177/1750635209345200. 
44 Brinson, 340. 
45 Brinson. 
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The general idea behind CONELRAD was relatively simple in theory but difficult 
to implement in practice. Brinson elaborates on this difficulty and discusses that the civil 
defense warning capability for the public was hampered by the fact that the program 
permitted limited radio stations to broadcast such messages, and in limited fashion, as the 
majority of stations first went silent to support the national defense objective.46 Larry 
Burkum highlights CONELRAD’s shortcomings, as well, mentioning that “[t]he plan 
called for all participating stations to switch to one of two frequencies, either 640 or 1240 
kilohertz, and reduce their operating power to not more [than] 10,000 watts and usually 
less than 5,000 watts.”47 Brinson explains another problem: the delay and equipment-based 
difficulties in stations ceased normal broadcasts and transferred to the designated 
CONELRAD warning frequencies.48 Brinson contends that limited broadcast coverage 
was a significant problem with CONELRAD as well.49 Ultimately, in 1963, CONELRAD 
officially ended.50 This replacement, which swiftly took its place, is known as the 
Emergency Broadcast System, or EBS.51 
The advent of the Emergency Broadcast System was representative of changes in 
military and broadcast technology. For example, missile and navigational technologies had 
improved to the point of negating any benefit to U.S. national defense in silencing radio 
transmissions, as it was believed the Soviets could effectively attack the United States even 
with cessation of radio broadcasting.52 The proliferation of television was another change; 
according to the FCC, by 1960 television sets were in 88 percent of American homes.53 
 
46 Brinson, 344–45. 
47 Larry G. Burkum, “This Is a Test: The Evolution of the Emergency Broadcast System History of 
Radio,” Journal of Radio Studies 2, no. 1 (1993): 143, https://doi.org/10.1080/19376529309384513. 
48 Brinson, “CONELRAD,” 346. 
49 Brinson, 353. 
50 Burkum, “This Is a Test,” 143. 
51 Burkum, 141. 
52 Brinson, “CONELRAD,” 351. 
53 Federal Communications Commission, 26th Annual Report of the Federal Communications 
Commission for Fiscal Year 1960 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1960), 2, 
https://www.fcc.gov/reports-research/reports/annual-reports-congress/26th-annual-report-congress-1960, as 
cited in Brinson, “CONELRAD,” 351. 
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Because of this proliferation, Brinson argues that television represented an untapped 
resource to send warnings to the American public.54 
According to the FCC, the Emergency Broadcast System had the goal of enabling 
all levels of government to warn the nation during crises in an expeditious manner.55 Much 
of the focus was on presidential alerting capabilities; as the FCC states, “The President 
requires a 5-minute capability, regardless of his whereabouts, to address the Nation 
following an Emergency Action Notification.”56 Thus, with this new system, the public 
warning and notification function was the point. Unlike CONELRAD, the Emergency 
Broadcast Service did not use special frequencies and incorporated both television and 
radio stations for warning purposes.57 
However, technology and threats continued to evolve over the intervening decades. 
In 1997, the Emergency Alert System officially replaced the Emergency Broadcast 
System.58 According to FEMA, this upgrade incorporated digital technology and worked 
with “broadcasters, cable television systems, wireless cable systems, satellite digital audio 
radio service (SDARS) providers and direct broadcast satellite (DBS) providers.”59 
Messages sent through this system to the public included a voice message and an attention-
grabbing tone.60 Technological parallels are easily drawn between the Emergency Alert 
System and CONELRAD. Just as the use of television exploded during CONELRAD’s 
time, the use of cellphones proliferated after the adoption of the Emergency Alert System. 
 
54 Brinson, “CONELRAD,” 351. 
55 Federal Communications Commission, 30th Annual Report of the Federal Communications 
Commission for Fiscal Year 1964 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964), 38, 
https://www.fcc.gov/document/30th-annual-report-fcc-1964. 
56 Federal Communications Commission, 38. 
57 Federal Communications Commission, 29th Annual Report of the Federal Communications 
Commission for Fiscal Year 1963 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1963), 35, 
https://www.fcc.gov/document/29th-annual-report-fcc-1963; and Burkum, “This Is a Test,” 147. 
58 “Emergency Alert System (EAS),” Federal Emergency Management Agency, January 1, 2016, 
https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/1465326763240-4152791226bbd49cf46aff8cd5f43bb1/
Emergency_Alert_System_Fact_Sheet_2016.pdf; “The Evolution of Emergency Broadcasting,” Federal 
Emergency Management Agency, accessed May 31, 2020, https://www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/ipaws/
ipaws_the_evolution_of_emergency_broadcasting.pdf. 
59 Federal Emergency Management Agency, “Emergency Alert System (EAS).” 
60 Federal Emergency Management Agency, “Evolution of Emergency Broadcasting.” 
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Anthony Gargano highlights that cellphones represented an incredibly powerful medium 
through which to alert the public.61 However, unlike in the CONELRAD story, the 
adoption of a new technology did not spell the end of the Emergency Alert System. 
Today, the United States relies on a system called IPAWS, or the Integrated Public 
Alert and Warning System, of which the Emergency Alert System is still a part. Gargano 
perhaps saw the writing on the wall, as one of the components of the new system is the 
mobile alerting capability through Wireless Emergency Alerts, or WEA; see Figure 1 for 
all components of the system.62  
 
 IPAWS Architecture63 
 
61 Anthony R. Gargano, “Emergency Alert System?” Broadcast Engineering 54, no. 1 (January 2012): 
1, ProQuest. 
62 Federal Emergency Management Agency, “IPAWS Architecture.” 
63 Source: Federal Emergency Management Agency. 
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B. BACKGROUND ON INCLUSIVE ALERTING AND RELATED POLICY 
In the United States, inclusive alerting has had a mixed record. However, as 
technology has improved, so too has the inclusivity of warning systems. For example, 
CONELRAD relied only upon radio stations to alert the public. As such, this warning 
mechanism only provided an audible means of disseminating emergency information, 
which excluded people who were deaf. With the advent of the Emergency Broadcast 
System, the medium of television was added to the national alert methodology and so too 
was at least some visual component to alerts.64 As time progressed, broadcasters were able 
to implement improvements to the technology and the Emergency Alert System eventually 
included digital technology; these alerts include a “digitally encoded header, attention 
signal, audio announcement and digitally encoded end-of-message marker.”65 
While this thesis does not include an exhaustive policy review, a few policies and 
acts are illustrative for this subject. The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), Executive 
Order 13407, the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act (commonly referred 
to as PKEMRA), and the Warning Alert Response Network Act (commonly referred to as 
the WARN Act) merit contemplation. Save for the ADA, these policies came in rapid 
succession following Hurricane Katrina in 2005 and all pertain to improving the nation’s 
public warning capability to varying degrees. 
The Americans with Disabilities Act was passed in 1990 and was updated in 
2008.66 Of particular interest is Title II, which covers state and local governments, where 
much of the burden for warnings and notifications rests.67 Specifically, section 12132 says, 
“[N]o qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded 
from participation in or be denied the benefits of services, programs, or activities of a public 
entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.”68 Indeed, several scholars 
 
64 Federal Communications Commission, 29th Annual Report, 2. 
65 Federal Emergency Management Agency, “Emergency Alert System (EAS).” 
66 Americans with Disabilities Act, as Amended. 
67 Americans with Disabilities Act, as Amended. 
68 Americans with Disabilities Act, as Amended. 
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have recognized the importance of Title II of the ADA within the context of disasters.69 
Nancy Jones references that “[a]lthough the ADA does not include provisions specifically 
discussing its application to disasters, its nondiscrimination provisions are applicable to 
emergency preparedness and responses to disasters.”70 Furthermore, Angi English asserts 
that the high percentage of Americans with disabilities underscores the importance of 
compliance with the ADA for disaster communications.71 
Executive Order 13407 was signed by President George W. Bush on June 26, 
2006.72 This document laid the administrative groundwork for what would eventually 
become the Integrated Public Alert and Warning System. In section 1, the order dictates 
that the United States and its inhabitants must have a robust, cohesive notification 
methodology for a wide variety of dangerous situations.73 This same section references 
that an important part of such a system is the capability for the president to send significant, 
disaster-related information to the nation, which had been an ongoing and important role 
of the Emergency Alert System.74 However, the order required several other pertinent 
actions as well. Section 2 places a great deal of responsibility on the secretary of homeland 
security for carrying out functions pertaining to this new warning methodology, such as 
the integration of the Emergency Alert System and an overall review of current notification 
and alert functionalities; it goes on to reference that the new system should operate based 
on the desires of the alert recipient and defined hazard areas.75 These features are 
recognizable as attributes of the modern Integrated Public Alert and Warning System. The 
 
69 Nancy Lee Jones, The Americans with Disabilities Act and Emergency Preparedness and Response, 
CRS Report No. RS22254 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2010), https://fas.org/sgp/
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71 English, “Communicating with Everyone during a Crisis.” 
72 George W. Bush, “Executive Order 13407 ‘Public Alert and Warning System,’” Weekly 
Compilation of Presidential Documents 42, no. 26 (June 26, 2006): 1226–28. 
73 Bush, 1226. 
74 Bush, 1226. 
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order goes on to say that “the public alert and warning system [must have] the capability 
to alert and warn all Americans, including those with disabilities and those without an 
understanding of the English language.”76 Thus, there is an acknowledgment that the new 
system should accommodate all persons, regardless of ability. 
Another relevant policy is PKEMRA, which was enacted in 2006.77 Section 513 
mandates the creation of a disability coordinator position within the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency.78 This position is charged with a wide variety of functions to ensure 
better representation for those with functional and access needs in emergency management 
processes, public outreach, and education efforts; the person who fills this position is also 
required to coordinate with disability advocacy groups and work with industry partners so 
that information on disasters is disseminated in inclusive formats.79  
Lastly, the WARN Act of 2006 mandates the creation of the Integrated Public Alert 
and Warning System.80 Of particular interest is a congressional hearing on the WARN Act 
during which Fred Upton, in his opening remarks, describes how previous incidents 
displayed gaps in the United States’ warning and notification methodology, including 
during Hurricane Katrina.81 He goes on to state, “What we must strive for is an emergency 
system that leaves no one behind.”82 The WARN Act stipulates that IPAWS must not rely 
on any one warning channel, must integrate existing warning methodologies, must utilize 
new technologies (such as cellular), must have geo-targeting capabilities for alerts, and 
 
76 Bush, 1226. 
77 Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006, Pub. L. 109-295 (2002), § 1394–1463, 
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78 Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006, 1408. 
79 Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006, 1408–9. 
80 Warning, Alert, and Response Network Act, H.R. 5785, 109th Cong., 2nd Sess. (August 1, 2006), 
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81 H.R. 5785, the Warning, Alert, and Response Network Act of 2006: Hearing Before the 
Subcommittee on Telecommunications and the Internet of the Committee on Energy and Commerce House 
of Representatives, House of Representatives, 109th Cong., 2nd sess., July 20, 2006, 1, 
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must be available for use by all levels of government.83 An overarching theme of the act 
is that the new system must alert as many Americans as possible.84 
These policies of the U.S. government highlight the need for inclusive alerting for 
the American public. This history of warnings and alerts in the United States shows general 
improvement over time through enhanced technology and through the acknowledgement 
that warnings must also effectively serve those who have disabilities and other barriers. 
Despite these advancements, however, as recent events demonstrate, the reality of alerting 
still misses the mark of an ideal warning framework. 
 
83 U.S. Congress, House. 
84 U.S. Congress. House. 
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III. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This thesis evaluates the ability of mobile alerting systems (Wireless Emergency 
Alerts and local mass notification systems), the Emergency Alert System (television and 
radio), and other technologies to effectively alert people who are deaf, blind, or experience 
other disabilities; people with limited English proficiency; and the elderly. Previous 
research shows that disasters impact such groups inordinately.85 Additionally, related 
literature has a wealth of information pertaining to warning methodologies commonly used 
within the emergency management community in the United States for the general public. 
For example, Bean and his coauthors examine many of these warning methodologies, even 
though their focus is on mobile alerting.86 The warning channels and systems reviewed for 
this thesis were chosen because they are generally available to emergency management at 
the local level, and local government is the first layer to respond in a disaster.  
This thesis employed a qualitative methodology that involved reviewing and 
evaluating source material on how well warning systems have served those with functional 
and access needs. These sources are publicly available, and are generally government or 
scholarly publications. The design employed the value proposition framework and 
associated canvas as its method to review the current capabilities (the haves) against the 
requirements of the selected groups to identify where these systems fall short (the needs).87 
This is an appropriate review framework as it considers both the systems in question and 
the circumstances of the individuals they were designed to warn within the context of client 
experience.88 The value proposition helped to generate recommendations, which are 
presented at the end of this thesis. Section B of this chapter provides a review of the value 
proposition process. 
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A. CASE STUDIES SELECTED 
To evaluate warning channels, this thesis also highlights five case studies. The first 
three case studies—the Oroville Dam evacuation in 2017, wildfires in the western United 
States between 2017 and 2018, and Hurricane Harvey in 2017—are relatively recent and 
illustrate how current warnings and notifications systems affected the outcomes of disasters 
in numerous ways. For these cases, the thesis fleshes out specific information about alerting 
the referenced groups, such as whether or not warnings were sent, received, and 
appropriately acted upon. These findings generate information to populate the value 
proposition canvas, including gaps and potential solutions. The value proposition canvas, 
which is described in Section B, is used as a method to tailor solutions to the warning 
requirements of people with functional and access needs based on the case studies.  
Two additional case studies—which focus on Canada’s and New Zealand’s alerting 
systems—are integrated to pose possible solutions. These countries were selected because 
they are English-speaking and because their alerting channels illustrate how others have 
overcome similar challenges. For the case studies, this thesis specifically reviews national 
warning methodology and accessibility practices. The findings of these case studies 
informed the value proposition canvas. 
B. VALUE PROPOSITION FRAMEWORK 
The objective of this thesis is to identify ways to warn people with functional and 
access needs more effectively in emergencies and disasters. The value proposition, 
developed by Alexander Osterwalder et al. and described in more detail below, is an apt 
framework for reviewing possible solutions.89 One of the advantages to the value 
proposition is that it heavily considers the perspective of the customers, or those who would 
potentially use a good or service. For this thesis, the customers are people who have 
functional or access needs and the service is emergency warning. 
 
89 Osterwalder et al., Value Proposition Design. 
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Value proposition, according to Osterwalder et al., “describes the benefits 
customers can expect from . . . products and services.”90 But how does this methodology 
reveal the perspective of the customer relative to a product or service? Two of the main 
tools the value proposition uses to identify the perspective of the customer are the value 
proposition map and the customer profile. The former defines the goods and services in 
question and in what ways they bring worth to the table by naming problems they overcome 
and how they seek to aid the target audience.91 The latter comprises an analysis of the 
desired objectives, potential stumbling blocks, and exertions of the target audience.92 
When the two combine, the result is the value proposition canvas, shown in Figure 2, which 
dovetails the product or services with the desires of the customer.93 
The methodology is best described by Osterwalder et al.: “With the Customer 
Profile . . . you clarify your customer understanding. With the Value Map . . . you describe 
how you intend to create value for that customer. You achieve Fit . . . between the two 
when one meets the other.”94 The idea of looking specifically at the needs of the customers, 
or individuals receiving alerts and warnings, is important for the often overlooked 
population of people with functional and access needs. As June Kailes and Alexandra 
Enders relay, “Typically, disaster preparedness and emergency response systems are 
designed for people for whom escape or rescue involves walking, running, driving, seeing, 
hearing, and quickly responding to directions.”95 Thus, the value proposition can help 
integrate the requirements of these end users. Understanding these demographic 
requirements is important for emergency managers who want to ensure that warning 
systems are as inclusive as possible. This thesis uses the value proposition to guide 
practitioners in their efforts to effectively warn all segments of their constituencies 
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(2007): 235, https://doi.org/10.1177/10442073070170040601. 
24 
 




96 Source: Osterwalder et al., 61. 
25 
IV. U.S. CASES IN INCLUSIVE ALERTING: IDENTIFYING GAPS 
While the 2017 Oroville Dam incident and subsequent evacuations received 
national attention, the incident was joined that year by numerous devastating hurricanes 
and wildfires, some of which this thesis details later. These nearly concurrent incidents 
deserve careful analysis, as they contain valuable lessons for the future, including lessons 
about public warnings. In addition to the Oroville incident, this chapter focuses on the 2017 
and 2018 California wildfires and Hurricane Harvey, and draws conclusions about where 
government warnings fell short for those most vulnerable. 
A. OROVILLE DAM INCIDENT 
During the Oroville Dam incident, government organizations had to issue 
evacuations for a wide variety of persons, some of whom were elderly or were experiencing 
disabilities. When government entities disseminate warnings and other communications to 
such a large cross-section of the public, other alert originators should take note of their 
practices, to include reviewing them as case studies. 
At over three million acre-feet, the reservoir at Oroville, situated along the Feather 
River in northern California, is the second largest non-natural lake in the state.97 The 
reservoir also has recreational features, as there is a nearby boat ramp and a scenic 
overlook.98 Oroville Dam is a feat of engineering. According to the city of Yuba City, 
California, “At 770 feet high, it is the tallest dam in the U.S. and serves mainly for water 
supply, hydroelectricity generation and flood control.”99 The threat posed from a failure at 
this structure was dire due to the downstream consequences of an uncontrolled release of 
water. 
 
97 City of Yuba City, Yuba City Fire Department, and Yuba City Police Department, Post Incident 
Action Summary: Flood Watch 2017 (Yuba City, CA: City of Yuba City, 2017), 5, 
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98 “Lake Oroville Spillway Incident: Timeline of Major Events February 4–25,” State of California 
Department of Water Resources, February 21, 2017, 2, https://www.palmdalewater.org/wp-content/
uploads/2017/04/Item5.1.pdf. 
99 City of Yuba City, Yuba City Fire Department, and Yuba City Police Department, Post Incident 
Action Summary, 5. 
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In February 2017, the area experienced a tremendous amount of precipitation.100 The 
ensuing issue at the dam was a veritable one-two punch. Agency personnel from 
California’s Department of Water Resources noted an irregularity at one of the spillways 
at the dam (not the dam itself) on February 7, 2017.101 Officials detected damage to the 
concrete after stopping the outflow of water through this spillway for inspection.102 Over 
the next several days, while this spillway was shut off for continued work, the level of the 
reservoir continued to rise due to rainfall and incoming water from upstream.103 As a 
result, the other (emergency) spillway had its first real-world use on February 11.104 
However, this spillway, too, developed an alarming issue. While officials had predicted 
that the hillside below the emergency spillway would wear away to some extent, they had 
not expected the rapid rate at which this process degraded the hillside.105 When they 
noticed this situation, on February 12, local law enforcement issued an evacuation order 
for the downstream area.106 Despite the concern over the spillways and the evacuations 
(for which orders lasted a few days), the reservoir level eventually subsided and the 
emergency spillway no longer had water flowing over it, which enabled dam personnel to 
assess damage.107 See figures  3 and 4 for a map of the incident area and an overview of 
Oroville Dam. 
 
100 City of Yuba City, Yuba City Fire Department, and Yuba City Police Department, 5; Department 
of Homeland Security Analytic Exchange Program, Communication Tools to Increase Communities’ 
Resilience (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2017), 6, 
https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=826437. 
101 State of California Department of Water Resources, “Lake Oroville Spillway Incident,” 1. 
102 State of California Department of Water Resources, 1. 
103 State of California Department of Water Resources, 1. 
104 State of California Department of Water Resources, 1. 
105 State of California Department of Water Resources, 1. 
106 State of California Department of Water Resources, 1. 
107 State of California Department of Water Resources, 1. 
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 Map of Area Surrounding Oroville Dam108 
 
108 Source: Madison Park and Eliott C. McLaughlin, “Evacuations Ordered over Concerns at 




 Oroville Dam Overview109 
1. Incident Alerts 
The Oroville Dam incident involved a massive response effort. First, the incident 
ultimately resulted in mandates for approximately 200,000 persons to evacuate.110 The 
Department of Homeland Security study describes the Oroville Dam incident as “the 
largest ‘peacetime’ non-hurricane related evacuation in U.S. history.”111 Second, the 
incident onset time was rapid: only sixty minutes elapsed between the initial public 
dissemination of emergency notifications and the potential dam failure.112  There are three 
key communication and warning takeaways from this incident. First, given the timeframe 
of the incident and warnings, people with functional and access needs benefit from more 
forewarning of pending threats. Second, public outreach and education efforts are 
important for warning efficacy among people with disabilities, the elderly, or people with 
 
109 Source: State of California Department of Water Resources, “Lake Oroville Spillway Incident,” 2. 
110 Department of Homeland Security Analytic Exchange Program, Communication Tools, 3. 
111 Department of Homeland Security Analytic Exchange Program, 9. 
112 City of Yuba City, Yuba City Fire Department, and Yuba City Police Department, Post Incident 
Action Summary, 2; Department of Homeland Security Analytic Exchange Program, Communication Tools, 
10. 
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limited or no ability to communicate in English. Third, alert originators should use more 
varied means for alerting their constituents. 
a. Early Warnings 
The timeframe of the Oroville incident presented challenges for evacuation. For 
example, as revealed at a joint Sutter and Yuba Counties public feedback session following 
the incident, the evacuation orders took residents by surprise, as they had received little 
information about the worsening conditions at the Dam before the orders.113 Due to the 
rapid progression of the incident and the very short time between the first public warnings 
and the potential spillway failure, the people in harm’s way had to act very quickly (see 
Figure 5). However, as many residents at the public feedback session discussed, there was 
a great deal of confusion surrounding the evacuation. Several residents referenced that the 
public did not have the information they needed, when they needed it.114 One man argued 
at the forum that the forewarning to the public could have happened much earlier, allowing 
for more time to evacuate; while hiking near the dam, he claimed that Department of Water 
Resources personnel had told him the dam was in danger and that he should leave 
immediately, and he cited a ninety-minute warning delay thereafter.115  
 
113 “Oroville Dam Spillway Evacuation Feedback Session,” Sutter County, California, March 16, 
2017, https://www.suttercounty.org/doc/government/depts/cao/em/stormupdate. 
114 Sutter County, California. 
115 Sutter County, California. 
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 Oroville Dam Incident Warning Timelines116 
While short lead times can prove challenging for the general public, they are even 
more problematic for those with functional and access needs. As shown in Figure 5, 
indecisiveness and overall delays in warnings can become problematic, especially when 
the potential for a catastrophic spillway failure could occur in roughly one hour. Indeed, 
Mileti mentions that in incidents such as Oroville, effective warnings and notifications can 
prove extremely beneficial for positive disaster outcomes, especially when warnings are 
redundant, expeditiously sent, and crafted and planned well.117 In the joint Sutter and Yuba 
County public response meeting, there were several references to evacuation difficulties 
for people with functional and access needs.118 One woman with vision loss said she stayed 
 
116 Source: Dennis S. Mileti, “Modernizing Public Warning Messaging” (paper presented at the 
National Tsunami Hazard Mitigation Program [NTHMP] Annual Meeting, San Diego, CA, January 30, 
2019), 19, https://nws.weather.gov/nthmp/2019annualmeeting/Mileti.pdf. 
117 Mileti, 12–32. 
118 Sutter County, California, “Oroville Dam Spillway Evacuation Feedback Session.” 
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with a friend during the incident and that they were both unable to leave; another woman 
had to return to her home in an evacuation zone due to a lack of accessibility at a shelter.119 
The speed at which the incident at Oroville progressed is particularly troubling. As 
the National Council on Disability contends, “there are significant concerns about rapid 
onset events, especially for people with disabilities, who may require additional time to 
shelter in place or evacuate to a safer location.”120 Mileti, the National Council on 
Disability, and the lessons of the Oroville incident all underscore the importance of timely 
warnings and notifications, particularly for people with functional and access needs. 
b. Public Education, Outreach, and Planning 
Another takeaway from the Oroville incident is the importance of public outreach 
and education within the context of warnings. This is especially true for those with 
functional and access needs, as the National Council on Disabilities has argued.121 During 
the joint Sutter and Yuba County public response meeting, the public speakers in 
attendance raised concerns about warning sirens, the timeframe of warnings, and access to 
technology to receive vital information.122 For example, one gentleman complained that 
there were not enough warnings and that alerts should have been more expeditious; with 
more forewarning, he said, he could have assisted a friend experiencing vision loss.123 
While another man appreciated the information flow from an elected official’s office later 
in the incident, he believed that there should have been more of it.124 While the city’s local 
mass notification system was used promptly during the incident, officials needed to 
promote its use with the public.125.  
 
119 Sutter County, California. 
120 National Council on Disability, Effective Emergency Management: Making Improvements for 
Communities and People with Disabilities (Washington, DC: National Council on Disability, 2009), 39, 
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121 National Council on Disability, 95. 
122 Sutter County, California, “Oroville Dam Spillway Evacuation Feedback Session.” 
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124 Sutter County, California. 
125 City of Yuba City, Yuba City Fire Department, and Yuba City Police Department, Post Incident 
Action Summary, 3. 
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The Department of Homeland Security study, too, underscores the point that, for 
people with functional and access needs, public trust “also affects the willingness of 
vulnerable community members to share information about themselves. . . . Emergency 
managers found that their participation in community engagement activities (including 
formal information sessions . . . ) created public trust and buy-in for these efforts.”126 Thus, 
public education and outreach are of vital importance, especially for those with potential 
barriers to receiving warnings and notifications. 
c. Varying Means 
The final takeaway from the Oroville incident is that alert originators should use as 
many means to warn the public as possible, as individuals may have different needs or 
preferences. This idea is supported by the joint Sutter and Yuba County public response 
meeting, during which residents mention a wide variety of warning and notification 
systems, including sirens, phone-based systems, and television and radio.127 When the 
comments by the public are taken in aggregate, they generally support all of these systems 
being used more, and in tandem.128  
The academic literature supports this concept. Mileti strongly suggests that, rather 
than relying on one warning system, alert originators should use a wide variety of 
systems.129 While weaknesses and strengths are inherent in each system, this strategy, 
Mileti posits, can help meet the needs of people who have disabilities, who are away from 
home, who have limited proficiency in English, and others.130 The Department of 
Homeland Security came to the same conclusions, suggesting that different individuals, 
including those with disabilities, may be better served by different systems; therefore, 
numerous systems should be used to ensure effective warnings.131  
 
126 Department of Homeland Security Analytic Exchange Program, Communication Tools, 20. 
127 Sutter County, California, “Oroville Dam Spillway Evacuation Feedback Session.” 
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129 Mileti, “Modernizing Public Warning Messaging,” 21–28. 
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2. Conclusion 
While thankfully the Oroville Dam spillway remained intact and there was no 
inundation of downstream areas, the incident still involved a massive evacuation effort.132 
This enormous undertaking suggests that expeditious warnings and notifications are of vital 
importance to people with functional and access needs, that public warning outreach and 
education are similarly important, especially for those with disabilities or other access 
barriers, and that government agencies should not rely on one system. 
B. 2017 AND 2018 CALIFORNIA WILDFIRES 
In recent years, wildfires in the United States have been particularly challenging 
for public safety agencies and residents of impacted areas. The number of government 
jurisdictions involved, the rapid timeframe of incident onset, impacted infrastructure, and 
depletion of resources have been exacerbating factors during the response to these 
noteworthy conflagrations. The strain on public safety entities has been immense.  
The Tubbs Fire occurred in the California counties of Napa and Sonoma in  
autumn 2017; while the Tubbs Fire was part of a group of concurrent fires dubbed the 
Complex Fires, Tubbs covered the most territory.133 The Tubbs fire killed 22 people and 
destroyed 5,636 buildings.134 Additionally, the affected land area was estimated at over 
110,000 acres.135 The Sonoma County after-action report for the Complex Fires highlights 
that previous fire incidents had moved at a far slower pace.136 The reported further stated, 
“The scope, scale, and duration of the wildfires pushed the County’s Emergency 
 
132 Sutter County, California, “Oroville Dam Spillway Evacuation Feedback Session.” 
133 County of Sonoma, October 2017 Complex Fires: Emergency Operations Center After Action 
Report & Improvement Plan (Santa Rosa, CA: County of Sonoma, 2018), 5, https://sonomacounty.ca.gov/
WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=2147560486; Office of the Auditor of the State of California, 
California Is Not Adequately Prepared to Protect Its Most Vulnerable Residents from Natural Disasters, 
Emergency Planning Report 2019-103 (Sacramento, CA: Office of the Auditor of the State of California, 
2019), 12, https://www.auditor.ca.gov/reports/2019-103/chapters.html. 
134 David Hawks, “Camp Fire - November 8, 2018” (paper presented at the 5th Annual Conference - 
Nevada Division of Forestry, Reno NV, April 22, 2019), http://forestry.nv.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/
05/Camp-Fire-Presentation-Fire-Adapted-Nevada-Final.pdf. 
135 County of Sonoma, October 2017 Complex Fires, 6. 
136 County of Sonoma, 9. 
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Operations Center (EOC) facility, systems, and staff well beyond their design limits  
and experience. Some 660 EOC staff provided over 33,000 hours of service during 47 days 
of activation.”137 
Additionally, two noteworthy California fires in 2018 were the Woolsey and Camp 
Fire incidents, which happened concurrently in autumn.138 The Woolsey Fire annihilated 
1,643 buildings and impacted an area in Los Angeles and Ventura Counties of 96,949 
acres.139 The Camp Fire eliminated nearly 19,000 buildings and charred more than 83,000 
acres.140 However, there is one notable difference between these fires—the human toll. 
Whereas the Woolsey Fire killed three people, the Camp Fire resulted in eighty-five 
deaths.141 All three of these fires presented challenges within the alerting arena, especially 
for people with functional and access needs. 
1. Incident Alerts 
According to the Office of the Auditor of the State of California, the wildfires had 
an outsized effect on seniors and impacted others with functional and access needs; Table 
2 shows fatality data for this group.142 As with the Oroville Dam incident, these fires offer 
communication and warning takeaways. First, public and alert originator education and 
planning are vital. And second, alert originators should not rely on too few channels to 
warn the public, and must use—and maintain—the systems available to them. 
 
137 County of Sonoma, 1. 
138 Citygate Project Team, After Action Review of the Woolsey Fire Incident: County of Los Angeles 
(Los Angeles: County of Los Angeles, 2019), 2, https://lacounty.gov/recovery/report/; Hawks, “Camp 
Fire.” 
139 Citygate Project Team, After Action Review of the Woolsey Fire Incident, 4. 
140 Hawks, “Camp Fire.” 
141 Citygate Project Team, After Action Review of the Woolsey Fire Incident, 1; Hawks, “Camp Fire.” 
142 Office of the Auditor of the State of California, California Is Not Adequately Prepared, 13. 
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Table 2. Wildfire Fatality Demographic Information143 
 
 
a. Public Education, Outreach, and Planning 
According to a recent NEMA wildfire emergency management workshop 
summary, wildfire notifications are not as well developed as those for other hazards, such 
as for severe weather, even though wildfires are increasing in magnitude and frequency.144 
Education for and planning with the public for these events is important. Indeed, the Office 
of the Auditor observes that, during the California wildfires, several local governments 
“sent messages through notification systems that reach landlines and reach a person’s cell 
phone only if that person has preregistered to receive emergency alerts from the 
county.”145 Public coordination and outreach must happen before an emergency to 
encourage registration with such mass notification systems. Additionally, various local 
alert originators have different authorization procedures, inconsistent alert language, 
different software programs, insufficient confidence in Wireless Emergency Alert 
technology, and varying capabilities, and there is little collaboration among such 
entities.146 Based on the 2018 wildfire season, NEMA identified a dearth of consistent 
standards as an issue within wildfire alerting, and identified a need for teaching alert 
 
143 Source: Office of the Auditor of the State of California, 13. 
144 National Emergency Management Association, “Wildfire Alert & Notification Workshop.” 
145 Office of the Auditor of the State of California, California Is Not Adequately Prepared, 2. 
146 National Emergency Management Association, “Wildfire Alert & Notification Workshop.” 
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originators how to use Integrated Public Alert and Warning System.147 These issues point 
to a need for increased education and planning for, by, and between alert originators. 
After the Complex Fires, Sonoma County also identified shortfalls in alerting 
persons with access needs. As the county explains, local law enforcement used a mass-
notification system in several instances.148 However, the county noted the need to 
incorporate Spanish-language emergency messaging and to “work with the Access and 
Functional Needs (AFN) Advisory Group to develop messaging, communications, and 
services that fully address the requirements of the whole community.”149 After the 
Woolsey Fire, Los Angeles County also found that alerting authority personnel lacked 
procedures for and education on the local mass-notification system, and a hesitance to use 
Wireless Emergency Alerts due to fears of over-alerting regions not impacted by the 
fire.150  
Overall, the Office of the Auditor concluded that California counties had not 
planned sufficiently to warn the public about the wildfires.151 Public safety agencies did 
not fully appreciate or research the social makeup of their jurisdictions, which led to 
ineffectual planning, particularly for vulnerable populations; the auditor’s report mentions 
the need to work with community partners and for the State of California to bolster local 
efforts and to follow state statutory mandates.152 These examples underscore the 
importance of planning and education for public safety agencies. 
b. Varying Systems 
Relying on too few systems may mean only a small fraction of the population can 
benefit from warnings. During the Woolsey Fire, response personnel put too much faith in 
Twitter’s ability to successfully warn the public, and underused actual warning systems, 
 
147 National Emergency Management Association. 
148 County of Sonoma, October 2017 Complex Fires, 5–7. 
149 County of Sonoma, 22. 
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including Wireless Emergency Alerts, local mass-notifications, and the Emergency Alert 
System—including mobile alerts, though many sources note that mobile alerting is not 
perfect.153 When discussing the counties’ challenges for reaching vulnerable populations, 
the Office of the Auditor states, “Despite having access to [Wireless Emergency Alerts] 
that could reach all cell phones in their evacuation zones, Butte and Sonoma did not send 
alerts using that technology.”154 It is worth noting, however, that not all cellphones in a 
given area are compatible with such systems, and that cellular towers had been damaged 
by wildfires on numerous occasions, which hampered the ability to send Wireless 
Emergency Alerts; the county of Los Angeles recognizes that they failed to account for 
how infrastructure disruptions could detrimentally impact emergency notifications during 
the Woolsey Fire.155 The Office of the Auditor recommends the use of multiple warning 
systems, in part, to circumvent potential damages to communications systems.156 While 
most coverage about the Wireless Emergency Alerts systems has been about its underuse, 
a New York Times article from late 2017 references a Wireless Emergency Alert the state 
of California sent to numerous counties warning of hazardous fire conditions.157  
Butte County compiled a series of lessons-learned videos for the Camp Fire 
incident, and one highlights how people with access and functional needs are vulnerable in 
disasters.158 The video makes mention of how mass notification calls only reached a 
fraction of the persons impacted in the county.159 One of the other videos describes how 
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emergency notifications were hampered by cellular infrastructure damage from the fire.160 
The themes generally parallel the other fires. 
This public discussion did not go unnoticed by California’s state legislature, and 
efforts to implement changes are in the works. According to a California state senator, in 
early 2020, the California legislature initiated an effort to address the gaps in alerting 
highlighted by the fires and the previously referenced audit.161 This effort was represented 
by Senate Bill 794.162 As of June, 2020, the bill had passed in the California State Senate 
and was referred to committee within the California State Assembly.163 The bill, in its May 
26, 2020, iteration, contains several revisions to California State statutes. It would permit 
local government to take steps to improve warnings and notifications for constituents with 
functional and access needs and would require certain emergency planning functions. 
Generally, local mass notifications systems require users to register and input their own 
data into the system in order to receive warnings. Phone listings for landline telephones 
may be automatically integrated, though this technology has seen diminished use. The bill 
would permit local public safety officials, in certain circumstances, to use phone numbers 
and similar personal data from other government databases to register vulnerable people, 
or their caretakers, for local mass-notification systems.164 However, the persons affected 
must be notified if this registration occurs and have the ability to remove their information 
from the local mass-notification system.165 Additionally, this bill would require integration 
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of vulnerable populations into the local emergency planning process.166 The bill would 
give local public safety agencies access to cellphone numbers (if available) from other 
government sources, thus eliminating the need for users to self-register. 
Another state response following the 2017 and 2018 wildfire seasons was a warning 
and notifications guidelines document published by the California Governor’s Office of 
Emergency Services in March 2019.167 One of the overarching purposes of the document 
was to make emergency warnings more uniform throughout California.168 The guidelines 
have integrated many planning practices on the warning of vulnerable populations. While 
time will tell how effective California’s efforts will be to solve warning shortfalls, these 
efforts represent those of only one state out of fifty in the United States. If these efforts are 
successful, they may be able to serve as a guide for alerting authorities in other regions. 
2. Conclusion 
The California wildfires of 2017 and 2018 were particularly challenging, for local 
public safety agencies and the public alike. The rapid expansion of the fires and large areas 
impacted, along with concurrent, multijurisdictional responses and communications 
disruptions, proved particularly challenging for responders. These challenges also 
extended into the realm of public warnings and notifications. There are numerous key 
observations from the fires: public and alert originator education and planning are vital; 
alert originators should not rely on too few channels to warn the public; the Wireless 
Emergency Alerts system is underused; and damaged warning infrastructure will hamper 
efforts to warn the public. 
Data about incident-related fatalities suggest that the elderly and other vulnerable 
populations suffered in a disproportionate manner.169 While it is impossible to know the 
exact extent to which timely warnings and notifications through redundant channels could 
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have improved incident outcomes for people with access and functional needs, the 
literature highlights this area as a shortfall for incident response during the 2017 and 2018 
wildfires. 
C. HURRICANE HARVEY 
The hurricanes of 2017 proved to be particularly challenging for all levels of 
government, and for the public within the paths of the storms. According to the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency’s after-action report for that hurricane season, 
“Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria caused a combined $265 billion in damage and 
resulted in widespread displacement of survivors.”170 Hurricane Ike was the last hurricane 
before Harvey to slam Texas, and it made landfall nearly nine years earlier.171 Harvey 
attained tropical storm status on August, 17, 2017, having formed a few days earlier near 
Africa.172 Harvey moved generally westward, through the Caribbean, gaining strength.173 
A Category 4 storm by the time it crashed into Texas, Harvey brought incredible damage 
during the evening of August 25.174 Exacerbating the situation, the storm stalled its 
advance and the rainfall caused incredible flash flooding around Houston.175 Hurricane 
Harvey ultimately killed 103 persons in the United States, through primary or secondary 
means, and caused $125 billion in damage.176 Furthermore, Galveston and Harris Counties 
received a tremendous amount of rainfall.177 Not surprisingly, the primary impacts for 
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Harrison County (where Houston is located) were related to flooding.178 The National 
Weather Service also recorded numerous wind gusts in excess of 100 miles per hour near 
Rockport (northeast of Corpus Christi and southwest of Houston); see Figure 6.179  
 
 Hurricane Harvey Wind Gusts180 
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Even in an extremely eventful year for disasters in the United States, Hurricane 
Harvey stood out due to its major impacts in a very populous part of the country. According 
to the National Hurricane Center, prior to the storm’s impact, the organization (as part of 
the National Weather Service) issued an ominous bulletin on August 24, which stated in 
part, “HARVEY HEADED TOWARD THE TEXAS COAST . . . LIFE-THREATENING 
AND DEVASTATING FLOODING EXPECTED NEAR THE COAST DUE TO HEAVY 
RAINFALL AND STORM SURGE.”181 At that time, numerous watches and warnings 
were already in place; yet the impacts were still devastating.182 
1. Incident Alerts 
There are several takeaways from Hurricane Harvey. First, research suggests that 
residents with functional and access needs were impacted disproportionately by flooding 
from Harvey.183 Emergency management must therefore better incorporate this population 
into emergency planning and the public education process. The literature also suggests 
timely warnings could have been hampered by overwhelmed or damaged infrastructure. 
And finally, the incident underscores that warning systems should be improved to better 
serve those with functional and access needs and that resilient, alternative technologies  
are vital.  
a. Public Education, Outreach, and Planning 
Individuals with disabilities lived in greater concentrations in the most flood-
impacted areas around Houston during Hurricane Harvey.184 While there is previous 
disaster research for other populations, there is little literature that focuses on people with 
functional and access needs.185 In an article titled “Hurricane Harvey and People with 
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Disabilities,” however, the authors highlight this gap.186 As they conclude: “Statistical 
findings indicate that the overall proportion of civilian noninstitutionalized persons with a 
disability is significantly greater in neighborhoods with higher proportions of flooded 
area. . . ”187 Thus, within the context of Harvey, warnings and notifications for those with 
disabilities were even more important; as this research suggests, they may have been more 
susceptible to flooding. 
The incident demonstrates the need for increased coordination, planning, and 
education between emergency management and people with functional and access needs. 
The Texas Disability Task Force on Emergency Management published an after-action 
report for Hurricane Harvey that specifically addresses functional and access needs issues 
during and after the storm.188 The task force broke recommendations down into numerous 
categories, including communication.189 One recommendation states, “A meeting should 
be held specific to issues related to accessible emergency telecommunications in the 
context of alerts, warnings, notifications, and response to disasters.”190 While the task 
force does not elaborate more on the issue, this recommendation shows that more work is 
required. The task force goes on to recommend that the Texas Division of Emergency 
Management should create a new functional and access needs liaison to bolster the lines of 
communication between public safety and functional and access needs organizations.191 
Furthermore, it makes several recommendations to improve coordination, planning, and 
education between local emergency management and disability communities.192 The 
overarching theme is to bolster relationships, share information, and engage in pre-
planning between the aforementioned groups for improved outcomes for people with 
functional and access needs in future disasters. 
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b. Early Warnings 
Timeliness of warnings is another concern. Area 9-1-1 centers experienced greatly 
increased call volume during Hurricane Harvey.193 This situation, when coupled with 
infrastructure damaged described below, could easily lead to delayed alerts or an inability 
to send them; as Mileti has highlighted, the timeliness of alerts is vital in ensuring they are 
effectual.194 Such delays have detrimental impacts on the broader public, and especially 
those with functional and access needs, as the latter could take longer to react after 
receiving an alert.195 
c. Varying Means 
Another aspect illuminated by Harvey is the need for accessibility updates to 
Wireless Emergency Alerts. While upgrades to this system were stressed even before 
Harvey, Emergency Manager Francisco Sánchez explains that the system should be able 
to send alerts in languages other than English and should be able to include audio, 
graphical, and video components.196 Sánchez goes on to reference how these capabilities, 
if added to the system, would benefit those with functional and access needs.197 “Had 
multimedia capabilities been available for WEA messages [during Hurricane Harvey],” he 
writes, “inundation maps, traffic maps and infographics with protective measures could 
have been sent to residents, alerting them to hazards they may not have been familiar 
with.”198 Thus, he makes the point that multimedia messages are useful in conveying 
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information to message recipients in situations that may be challenging. He mentions, too, 
how this capability could allow messages to be conveyed via American Sign Language.199  
The impacts on communication infrastructure from Hurricane Harvey were 
devastating and widespread, and underscore the area’s limited resilience. Numerous 
sources document how poorly the infrastructure fared in the face of the hurricane.200 
Indeed, according to a Federal Communications Commission impact report for August 27, 
2017, four counties had more than half of their cellular infrastructure taken out of 
commission by the storm.201 Figure 7 provides a snapshot of impacts to cellular 
communications following Hurricane Harvey. Other forms of communications 
infrastructure were also impacted, such as cable television and radio stations; nine radio 
stations ceased to broadcast due to the storm and nearly 150,000 customers lost cable or 
similar television provision.202 
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 Cell Infrastructure Impacts from Harvey203 
Importantly, however, the FCC had no indication that broadcast television had been 
impacted as of that date (27 August).204 Such communication disruption is problematic for 
warning the public, as such media are avenues through which government alerting 
authorities send warnings. Indeed, the Emergency Alert System relies on television (cable 
and broadcast) and radio.205 Additionally, Wireless Emergency Alerts rely on cellular 
broadcast technology.206 Thus, the outages would have greatly hampered the ability to 
send warnings and notifications to the public regarding evacuations and other vital 
information. 
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Another vital aspect of damage from the storm was the 9-1-1 centers or Public 
Safety Answering Points (PSAPS).207 While this made it difficult for the public to contact 
9-1-1 centers in the wake of Harvey, it also made it difficult for public safety agencies to 
reach the public.208 Recent information from FEMA demonstrates just how many 9-1-1 
emergency communications centers are authorized to disseminate such alerts.209 These 
centers may also send alerts through local mass notifications systems as well.  
2. Conclusion 
Hurricane Harvey was incredibly destructive, and emergency warnings in the wake 
of the storm fell short in several areas. Individuals with disabilities may have been at a 
greater risk during the storm, and evidence supports a need for more public education, pre-
planning, and coordination with such populations. Additionally, a need exists for more 
resilient infrastructure and updates for improved accessibility in current warning systems. 
The communications dynamic following Harvey may have delayed or prevented alerts 
from being sent to the public. This is even more detrimental for people with functional and 
access needs, as they may require more time to react after receiving an alert.210  
Research conducted following Harvey has indicated that individuals with 
functional and access needs were more heavily grouped in areas most vulnerable to 
flooding in and around Houston.211 While more research is needed, there could be 
implications from this study for negative impacts to such communities with regard to 
infrastructure, which could hamper emergency communications, including warnings and 
notifications. Correspondence from emergency management practitioners with the FCC 
shows that updates are needed for the Wireless Emergency Alerts system, which would 
facilitate more effectual communication with people with functional and access needs.212 
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Lastly, an after-action report from the state of Texas focused specifically on 
Harvey-related issues for people with disabilities recommended bolstering pre-event 
planning and coordination between emergency management and functional and access 
needs groups to improve information flow during future incidents.213 The report also 
identified a need for continued planning for improving warning inclusivity for such 
communities.214 
This case study illustrates the simultaneous criticality and susceptibility of 
communications infrastructure. Indeed, this dynamic has already received attention 
following hurricanes such as Harvey.215 It also illustrates that people with functional and 
access needs may face an increased danger simply because of where they reside, and that 
warning technology must be more inclusive and redundant to better serve those with 
disabilities. Continued dialogue and planning are also needed. Technology, both cutting-
edge and archaic, must be utilized to ensure better inclusivity and reduce disruptions in 
vital emergency warnings. Better planning and coordination will also ensure the 
government is meeting the needs of some of its most vulnerable citizens.  
D. LESSONS FROM U.S. CASE STUDIES 
The Oroville Dam incident in 2017, the California wildfires in 2017 and 2018, and 
Hurricane Harvey in 2017 represent recent U.S. incidents in which warnings and 
notifications to the public shaped the outcome. Because warnings and notifications were 
important in these large incidents, emergency managers can glean many lessons. These 
case studies suggest warnings and notifications gaps for people with functional and access 
needs in the following areas: 
• Public education, outreach, and planning: While proposed legislation 
holds some promise in this arena, such as California’s Senate Bill 794, 
more work is needed to promote warning and notification systems to 
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people with functional and access needs; for instance, emergency 
management agencies must work to promote registration for local mass-
notification systems and to promulgate information about other systems. 
Such outreach may also bolster the confidence of vulnerable populations 
in public safety agencies and warning systems.216 
• Alert originator education and planning: As the wildfires and Oroville 
demonstrate, more education on and planning for warnings on the part of 
alert originators is crucial. Mileti identifies that planning for this function is 
often wholly inadequate.217 
• Timeliness of warnings: This particular aspect of warnings is of vital 
importance to people with functional and access needs, as they may have 
limited ability to quickly adhere to warning instructions.218 
• Reliance on too few systems: When alert originators rely on too few 
warning systems, segments of the population may not receive the warnings. 
The academic literature supports this idea, as no single system is perfect.219 
• Wireless Emergency Alerts: This system, which if often underused, has 
promise for people with access and functional needs. Local alert originators 
have called for updates to bolster the system’s accessibility. 
• Resilience of current warning infrastructure: The wildfires and 
Hurricane Harvey underscore the importance of resilient warning 
infrastructure. 
These six broad gaps have numerous implications for people with functional and access 
needs, and solutions are explored in Chapters VI and VII. 
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V. INTERNATIONAL CASES IN INCLUSIVE ALERTING: 
IDENTIFYING BEST PRACTICES 
International case studies can guide practitioners in the United States, as they 
provide examples of how other countries solve similar problems with different resources. 
This chapter reviews the warning systems and methodologies of Canada and New Zealand. 
These countries face diverse hazards and have recently updated their warnings and 
notifications systems. 
A. CANADA 
This section focuses on Canada’s current national warning program, a recent real-
world incident, and accessibility practices. The conclusions are plugged into the value 
proposition in Chapter VI and support the overall recommendations in Chapter VII. 
1. National Warning Methodology Overview 
Canada has a national warning methodology that is similar to the Integrated Public 
Alert and Warning System in the United States. At least one scholar, Hamilton Bean, 
contends that the Canadian system is instructive for the American system; he draws 
parallels between the two and also highlights their differences.220 The Canadian system is 
called the National Public Alerting System by government entities, but it is promoted as 
Alert Ready to those who might receive alerts.221 Government agencies at different levels 
have the authority to activate the system, and numerous alerting channels compose it, such 
as cellular providers and traditional broadcast media.222 As with similar services in other 
countries, Alert Ready is a public-private partnership.223  
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While the broadcast components (television and radio) have been involved in 
alerting the public in Canada for some years, the mobile phone alerting element did not 
come online until 2018.224 Known as the Wireless Public Alerting Service (WPAS), it 
sends text-like alerts to individuals in harm’s way. However, it does not send a typical text 
message; it relies on the same technology as Wireless Emergency Alerts in the United 
States. According to the Alert Ready website, this system uses “Cell Broadcast . . . a mobile 
technology that allows messages to be broadcast to all compatible wireless devices within 
a designated geographical area. Cell Broadcast . . . is not affected by network congestion 
because it uses a dedicated part of the network, separate from that used for traditional voice 
and data traffic.”225 Alerts consist of a textual description of the hazard and other 
information, as well as an audible attention-grabbing noise; phones also vibrate when they 
receive an alert.226 These wireless alerts, along with the television and radio broadcast 
components, are intended to reach a broad audience for a multitude of hazards and are 
meant to provide vital protective instructions to the public.227 
2. Accessibility Practices 
Canada’s new alerting technologies have not been implemented without road 
bumps. As a recent incident in Nova Scotia illustrates (described in more detail below), 
even the best warning and notification systems are often limited by human action—or 
inaction—and, as others in the United States have found, it is important to use multiple 
channels to notify the public in emergencies. However, there are numerous positive lessons 
to glean from Canada as well. Specifically, the country uses methods that either directly or 
indirectly enhance the accessibility of alerts and notifications for those with functional or 
access needs. These methods include regular test alerts, bilingual alerting (English and 
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French), an easy-to-find public feedback portal for alerts, and an in-depth video series 
describing how Alert Ready works in American Sign Language . 
On April 18 and 19, 2020, Nova Scotia experienced an active threats attack that 
ultimately killed over twenty people; based on news reports, the Canadian public safety 
officials did not issue alerts via the Alert Ready system.228 However, Canadian officials 
did use other means to communicate with the public. The Royal Canadian Mounted Police 
(RCMP) used social media, specifically Twitter, to disseminate information about the 
attack.229 See Figure 8 for a snapshot of the Tweets from this incident.230 In an interview 
after the incident, RCMP Commissioner Brenda Lucki described the “dynamic nature” of 
the incident as one of the potential reasons the Alert Ready system was not used.231 
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 Tweets from RCMP Nova Scotia during Active Shooter Attack232 
Unfortunately, not every constituent uses Twitter, and even those who do may not 
follow their police department or actively monitor their feed. Indeed, reliance on limited 
distribution channels is not recommended by alerting experts such as Dennis Mileti.233 
According to recent data from the Pew Research Center, the percentage of the population 
that uses Twitter declines with age; only 7 percent of U.S. adults aged 65 or older use 
Twitter.234 This means that roughly 93 percent of this elderly in the United States, some 
of whom have functional and access needs, would miss information disseminated solely 
on Twitter. While traditional media outlets may report on information originally 
 
232 Source: Royal Canadian Mounted Police Nova Scotia Twitter, accessed May 3, 2020, 
https://twitter.com/rcmpns. 
233 Federal Emergency Management Agency, “PrepTalks: Dr. Dennis Mileti.” 
234 Andrew Perrin and Monica Anderson, “Share of U.S. Adults Using Social Media, Including 




disseminated through social media, this does not happen quickly. Such delays are 
problematic in fluid public safety emergencies.  
A more recent incident suggests that Canadian alert originators are becoming more 
familiar with Alert Ready. On July 17, 2020, the Ontario Provincial Police Tweeted about 
their first use of the warning system.235 In the tweet, the department declares that its first 
activation of Alert Ready effectively warned the public about an “armed and dangerous 
person.”236 Canada also tests the Alert Ready system twice per year, including the wireless 
alerts component.237 In the United States, however, the federal government has only 
publicly tested the Wireless Emergency Alert system once, in 2018. Bean asserts that such 
regular testing efforts help to “[e]nsure that citizens are knowledgeable about the system 
and prepared to respond to mobile messages.”238 These public, regularly scheduled test 
alerts improve familiarity with the systems for the general population, but also for those 
with functional and access needs. The Alert Ready website states that “[e]mergency alerts 
may be read to the recipient if your device supports this feature.”239 Therefore, regularly 
scheduled and pre-promoted public tests would give the visually impaired, along with other 
segments of the population, a chance to test their ability to receive alerts through their 
devices. This gives visually impaired cell phone users a chance to identify any issues with 
screen reader technology on their device before true disasters and emergencies.  
Another promising alerting accessibility practice in Canada is a portal through 
which the public can ask questions or provide feedback.240 This practice enables the 
Canadian public to work through issues and identify solutions by collaborating with 
alerting authorities. Additionally, it may also allow government alerting authorities to 
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change their practices based on public feedback. Feedback is also helpful from individuals 
who use assistive technologies, such as screen readers, to receive alerts. Such technology 
adds another layer of complexity, and the ability to troubleshoot problems with government 
officials is important. 
The last example of Canada’s practices is a sign language video series on the Alert 
Ready system, which was produced by the wireless service providers.241 This series covers 
a host of aspects about the wireless alerts component of Alert Ready, in an accessible 
format for those who are hearing-impaired or deaf. 
Canada has made great strides in recent years in the alerting arena, especially for 
those who have functional or access needs. While the implementation of the Alert Ready 
system has not been perfect, Canada offers many lessons to alerting authorities in other 
countries regarding accessibility and inclusivity practices. 
B. NEW ZEALAND 
1. National Warning Methodology Overview: 
Based on the available literature, New Zealand has a similar warning and 
notification system to those of Canada and the United States. According to a government 
alerting document, New Zealand’s alerting protocol serves the public in times of 
emergency through alerts to a variety of channels “such as digital road signs, text messages, 
cell broadcast messages (Emergency Mobile Alerts), app screens, as well as the ability to 
utilise maps and URLs referred from within single or multiple . . . messages.”242 While 
there are other components to the system, such as television and radio alerts, New 
Zealand’s online preparedness literature prominently features the wireless part of this 
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system, Emergency Mobile Alerts.243 This alerting system comes already installed on 
certain phones; there is no sign-up or app involved.244  
As with mobile alerting systems in other countries, New Zealand’s system is 
geographically focused on areas most at risk in a given emergency, and government public 
safety entities are the alert senders for this system.245 According to the New Zealand 
Ministry of Civil Defense and Emergency Management, government alerting authorities 
can disseminate warnings and notifications for a whole host of hazards, including severe 
weather, biological events, infrastructure disruptions, large fires, hazmat releases, health 
incidents, and law enforcement incidents.246 As with the Canadian and U.S. systems, New 
Zealand’s Emergency Mobile Alerts are not standard text messages but are transmitted via 
cellular broadcast.247 This broadcast channel is robust and not as susceptible to delays as 
other avenues. 
2. Accessibility Practices 
New Zealand has a modern and comprehensive national alerting system, likely 
driven by the numerous hazards the country faces. While at least one media report has 
highlighted a delayed alert, New Zealand is continually advancing its warning 
methodology, including practices for individuals who have functional or access needs.248 
These practices include accessible public education information on alerts and notifications 
in numerous formats and languages, efforts to minimize technological and other known 
gaps,  and a regular national testing campaign. 
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New Zealand’s public education and outreach materials, at least online, are highly 
inclusive. For example, on the Emergency Mobile Alerts website, public education 
materials are available in twenty-four languages, and there is a video in New Zealand Sign 
Language.249 This site also contains audio files on a whole host of preparedness subjects 
in ten different languages, including English.250 However, unlike the United States and 
Canada, which can send bilingual cellular emergency alerts, New Zealand only has the 
capability of sending alerts in English.251 Still, New Zealand’s efforts are impressive. For 
example, the website has a page dedicated to people with functional and access needs, with 
sections for numerous languages, for people with hearing or vision impairments, and 
others.252 The page references formal warnings and notifications under the hearing 
impairment section and also dedicates a section to the importance of neighborhood-based 
assistance for those with functional and access needs.253 The page encourages these 
citizens to “[s]hare contact details [with neighbors] so you can get in touch if an emergency 
occurs.”254 This helps to ensure those with disabilities do not miss crucial alerts and 
notifications. Previous research has identified a lack of such person-to-person connections 
within functional and access needs communities, and it is an important area of necessary 
focus when it comes to preparedness.255  
Additionally, New Zealand established a Mobile Emergency Alerts interactive 
portal through which the public can provide feedback to government alerting 
authorities.256 As referenced with the Canadian example, such a portal can enable the 
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public to provide information about issues with previous alerts, including problems with 
assistive technologies, such as screen readers. 
A local government in New Zealand has implemented another unique inclusivity 
practice: in Auckland, the emergency management program, working with partners, 
distributed cellphones to the indigent population so they could stay informed during the 
COVID-19 pandemic.257 While the Auckland Council does not reference Emergency 
Mobile Alerts, if the devices they issued are compatible with the alert system, this would 
be yet another benefit from this program, especially since New Zealand has used 
Emergency Mobile Alerts during the pandemic.258 The use of a warning system for a 
slower moving disaster, such as a pandemic, is often not the norm. However, in a video 
address to the public on Facebook, Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern discusses the use of the 
phone-based warning system to send COVID-19 information to the public, explaining that 
it was impossible to use the system without the warning alarm sounding on recipients’ 
phones.259 The public responses to Ardern’s video were overwhelmingly positive.260 The 
only negative comment pertaining to the system came from someone who said they did not 
receive the alert.261 One news outlet in New Zealand indicated that the warning via the 
Emergency Mobile Alert system had been precommunicated to the public via New Zealand 
Civil Defence.262 
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In a final example, unlike the United States, New Zealand has tested its Emergency 
Mobile Alerts system nationwide numerous times, including in 2017, 2018, and 2019.263 
This testing helps the general public understand the alerts and also provides education for 
members of functional and access needs communities; furthermore, it allows them to test 
the assistive technologies before actual disasters occur.  
Overall, New Zealand has an impressive warning and notification program, with 
many good practices of inclusiveness, such as accessible public education materials, 
encouragement of public input about alerting systems, distribution of cellphones to 
underserved populations, and frequent testing of alerting systems. 
C. CONCLUSIONS 
While Canada and New Zealand use warning systems that are technologically 
similar to the Integrated Public Alert and Warning System in the U.S., they demonstrate 
practices of inclusivity worth noting for American alert originators. This is especially true 
for state and local alert originators as they play a vital role in the warning function in the 
United States. As such, these practitioners should consider the following practices 
demonstrated by Canada and New Zealand to bolster inclusivity in warnings: 
• Language inclusivity: Government websites on warning education should 
contain material in languages other than English to meet the needs of 
constituents. 
• Assistive technologies: Such websites should also contain information on 
assistive technologies for warnings and building neighborhood partnerships 
to benefit those with functional and access needs. 
• Testing of warning systems: Public tests of warning systems should be 
conducted to increase familiarity with these systems amongst all segments 
of the population – Bean supports this idea for the U.S.264 
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• Underserved populations: Indigent populations may be cut off from 
warnings and cell phone distribution programs could help to overcome such 
barriers in times of disaster. 
• Alternative tools: Using non-emergency channels, such as Jacinda 
Ardern’s Facebook video, in conjunction with warning systems can aid in 
explaining the situation to the public. 
While these case studies offer many beneficial takeaways for the United States, 
they also highlight lessons learned. The Canadian example reinforces the idea that over-
reliance on any one system for warnings and notifications is detrimental, as in the case of 
the Twitter example for the Nova Scotia incident.265  
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VI. APPLICATION OF VALUE PROPOSITION 
The value proposition framework, as developed by Osterwalder et al., considers the 
needs of clients within the context of a company’s functions or goods and thereby seeks to 
add worth through meeting those identified needs.266 Beyond its application to the private 
sector, this framework is helpful for the development of services, such as public warnings, 
within government as well. The value proposition canvas, as shown in Figure 9, 
demonstrates the lessons suggested by both the U.S. and international case studies in the 
preceding chapters. The idea behind the canvas for this thesis is to identify the 
shortcomings of current warning methodologies for people with functional and access 
needs by considering real-world incidents. This canvas also defines the components of 
effective warning systems to better inform warning practitioners. 
Warnings have two sides—the sender and the receiver. The improvement process 
must consider both of these groups. In Figure 9, people with functional and access needs 
are the customer segment (right half of the canvas) and the value proposition is effective 
warning systems (left half of canvas). The customer segment portion of the canvas is 
broken into three sections, customer jobs (what the customers are trying to do), customer 
pains in performing the jobs, and gains through which the customers might more easily 
accomplish the jobs. In the case of this canvas, these three sections are receiving effective 
warnings (customer jobs), ineffectual warning frameworks (customer pains), and traits of 
warnings that meet the needs of the customer segment (gains). 
The value proposition segment of the canvas is also broken into three parts: 
products and services (which should make the lives of the customers easier), pain relievers 
(aspects of the good or service that address customer pains), and gain creators (benefits of 
the good or service that enable customer job improvements). In the case of this canvas, 
these are public warning systems (products and services), benefits of such systems that are 
effective (gain creators), and how such systems reduce or eliminate the inadequacies of the 
status quo (pain relievers). 
 
266 Osterwalder et al., Value Proposition Design, 6–9. 
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272 Adapted from Strategyzer, “The Value Proposition Canvas.” 
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So, what would a government alert originator that implements this value 
proposition canvas look like? Generally, the organization’s leadership would support 
warning staff through planning, training, and education for multiple systems through 
resilient technologies. Although, when done effectively, this can consume a great many 
staff hours, an ideal alert originator would make the warning function a high priority. This 
is sometimes a challenge for jurisdictions that do not need to send warnings frequently. 
However, a proactive alerting authority would understand the vital importance of this 
function and dedicate appropriate resources to it. If effective warnings are not prioritized, 
it will be much harder to overcome barriers for the most vulnerable. 
Once the organization has allocated sufficient resources, it should implement 
inclusive warning planning activities. The organization would need to understand the needs 
of its residents and overcome associated barriers. Such an understanding could only come 
from community-centered planning and coordination efforts and ongoing dialogue with 
functional and access needs organizations and individuals. This understanding could lead 
to more effective use of technology to meet community needs. Different communities have 
different demographics, resources, and challenges. Thus, there are nuances associated with 
adequately serving the needs of the community, state, etc. An ideal emergency 
management agency or other alert originator has a solid understanding of the demographics 
of the served constituency and any associated needs or barriers pertaining to warnings. 
Inclusive warnings are bolstered through inclusive planning. 
Once the alert originator has allocated resources and implemented inclusive 
planning, the organization could leverage technology to overcome barriers to successful 
warnings. These technologies might look very different from one jurisdiction to another, 
depending on regional hazards and local needs. However, the organization would have 
numerous systems in place and would place a strong emphasis on resilience. Doing so 
acknowledges the academic work and case studies, which directly point to the drawbacks 
of an insufficient number of systems. The personnel charged with actually sending the 
warnings would need to be intimately familiar with the technology to ensure timely 
warnings, which are important for the general public but especially so for those with 
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functional and access needs. These attributes, and the lessons learned from the case studies, 
support the conclusions and recommendations in the next chapter. 
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VII. RECOMMENDATIONS, LIMITATIONS, 
AND CONCLUSIONS 
This thesis applied a qualitative approach to the research by reviewing three U.S. 
case studies of disasters and two international case studies of inclusive alerting. It then 
applied the lessons from these cases to the value proposition canvas. This final chapter 
presents eight recommendations based on the application of these cases to the canvas and 
identifies limitations and areas for further research. 
A. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Public warnings are a complex, multifaceted function of public safety. These facets 
include technological, social, psychological, and incident-specific factors, to name a few. 
For vulnerable populations, such as individuals with functional and access needs, effective 
warnings may have even more barriers. Alert originators and other warning stakeholders 
must consider such factors, and the evidence from the academic literature and cases 
underscores the importance of the following recommendations. To facilitate future action 
for the improvement of warnings and alerts, the recommendations are grouped by 
stakeholder category, as one set of recommendations may fall within the purview of alert 
originators while others include stakeholders for financial incentives. These stakeholders 
have the authority to implement change within the recommendation area. The idea is to 
assign recommendations to the organizations best suited to effect change. 
1. Local, State, and Federal Alert Originators, and Professional 
Associations 
The following recommendations focus on action items for alert originators and they 
pertain to warnings and notifications, preparedness, education, and planning actions to 
make warnings more accessible and inclusive. Professional emergency management 
associations also have an important role within this arena, as they promote education and 
cooperative planning efforts for emergency managers and other alert originators. These 
organizations must collaborate with and actively listen to functional and access needs 
advocacy groups, as well as individuals with these needs, to fully realize success. 
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a. Educate Constituents on Warning Systems and Plan to Meet 
Community-Specific Needs 
The case studies show the benefits of public education in warnings and warning 
systems. When there have been few outreach efforts, the efficacy of warnings has suffered. 
Additionally, these studies suggest that incorporating vulnerable populations into the 
warning planning process is vital. For example, a committee looking at lessons learned 
from Hurricane Harvey identified the need for a new role within state emergency 
management in Texas that would be dedicated to coordinating and planning for and with 
vulnerable populations.273 This effort is praiseworthy and should be implemented 
elsewhere. Moreover, inclusive education and planning lead to inclusive warnings. 
Government outreach and education efforts, including educational materials for online 
warning systems, should meet community-specific needs for inclusivity as determined by 
collaboration, and should include different formats and languages. 
Another consideration for accessibility of online warning educational literature is 
Section 508 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. Even if a government agency is not 
specifically mandated to adhere to these accessibility standards, agency leadership should 
consider doing so voluntarily.274 \ 
Finally, warning originators should consider people experiencing indigence and 
their susceptibility in disasters, as did Auckland, New Zealand, during the COVID-19 
pandemic.275 
b. Educate and Train Alert Originators 
While each incident is unique and some occur rapidly, alert originators must be able 
to disseminate clearly worded warnings expeditiously. Well-trained alert originators have 
a better chance of providing timely warnings and, thus, more forewarning for people with 
functional needs, who need more time to take the appropriate action—such as evacuating 
 
273 Texas Disability Task Force on Emergency Management, Hurricane Harvey, 4. 
274 “IT Accessibility Laws and Policies,” Section508.gov, accessed October 11, 2020, 
https://www.section508.gov/manage/laws-and-policies. 
275 Auckland Council, “Mobile Phones.” 
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due to a wildfire or imminent dam failure. The summary from the National Emergency 
Management Association Wildfire Alert and Notification Workshop highlights the 
importance of well-trained alert originators, and so does the Woolsey Fire after action 
review.276 Additionally, Mileti and the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and 
Medicine stress the importance of the language and specific instructions within warning 
communications.277 The National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine 
conclude, “Decades of work has identified that a variety of message characteristics—
including content, style, length, delivery, and type of recommended protective action—
influence public response.”278 The process is highly nuanced. 
The case studies reviewed in this thesis highlight the varied levels of alert originator 
training and education. So too does Art Botterell, who explains, “We’ve yet to develop 
professional [warning] norms or a standard of practice to guide them [alert originators]. 
We have no institution to compile and analyze warning experience.”279 One potential 
avenue for this education is through warning seminars conducted by emergency 
management associations, facilitated by subject matter experts. These organizations may 
also have the ability to implement an alert credentialing program. Some of these 
organizations already have certified emergency manager designation programs, such as the 
Emergency Management Association of Ohio and the International Association of 
Emergency Managers.280 A sub-designation or separate designation should be created for 
certified alert originators, based on criteria and standards developed within the membership 
of such organizations and by other subject matter experts. 
 
276 National Emergency Management Association, “NEMA Wildfire Alert & Notification 
Workshop”; Citygate Project Team, After Action Review of the Woolsey Fire Incident, 87. 
277 Federal Emergency Management Agency, “PrepTalks: Dr. Dennis Mileti”; National Academies of 
Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, Emergency Alert and Warning Systems, 23. 
278 National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, Emergency Alert and Warning 
Systems, 22. 
279 Bean, Mobile Technology, ix. 
280 “Ohio Certified Emergency Manager Program,” Emergency Management Association of Ohio, 
January 8, 2010, http://www.emaohio.org/project-2/; “Certification Intro,” International Association of 
Emergency Managers, accessed September 24, 2020, https://www.iaem.org/certification/intro. 
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c. Use All Warning Tools Available 
The incident in Nova Scotia and the Woolsey Fire highlight that overreliance on 
any one system is detrimental and that social media, while powerful, are not a replacement 
for a warning system, such as Wireless Emergency Alerts or a local mass-notification 
system, to actively grab attention. The academic and practitioner literature supports the 
idea that the use of more systems is preferred. The Oroville Dam case illustrates that the 
public prefers to have numerous systems in place, as different individuals have different 
alerting requirements. Mileti, too, supports the idea that more systems are generally better 
for effective warnings.281 Alert originators should use as many means to warn the public 
as possible to ensure a broader swath of the population receives the vital information. While 
nonemergency channels, such as social media, should not be used as standalone methods 
for warnings, Prime Minister Ardern has shown that social media use in conjunction with 
warning systems can help spread the word about emergency situations to the public.282 
d. Leverage Assistive Technology 
As technology progresses and more options become available for human interaction 
with devices, these technologies should be leveraged to make existing warning systems 
more accessible. The case studies, and numerous academic and practitioner documents, 
stress the importance of leveraging technology for inclusive alerting. Wireless Emergency 
Alerts hold a great deal of promise within this area, and FEMA continuously evaluates 
updates for the platform. One such promising development is that of hazards symbols 
(icons indicating the type of disaster or emergency, as shown in Figure 10), which may 
eventually accompany messages sent through Wireless Emergency Alerts.283 FEMA 
states, “The symbols are designed to complement text and audio alerts distributed as EAS 
 
281 Mileti, “Modernizing Public Warning Messaging,” 21. 
282 Ardern, “Evening Everyone.” 
283 Federal Emergency Management Agency, FEMA Integrated Public Alert and Warning System 




[Emergency Alert System] and WEA.”284 FEMA should be applauded for these efforts, and 
leadership must support such endeavors. Additionally, FEMA is working to add the 
functionality of warnings in languages other than just English.285 At the end of 2019, 
FEMA implemented Spanish-language capability to the Wireless Emergency Alert 
system.286 FEMA has also implemented other changes to the system that could make alerts 
more accessible.287 However, there is more to accessible alerting than just Wireless 
Emergency Alerts. 
 
 Potential Hazard Icons for Wireless Emergency Alerts288 
 
284 Federal Emergency Management Agency, 12. 
285 Federal Emergency Management Agency, 13. 
286 “Wireless Emergency Alerts,” Federal Emergency Management Agency, August 6, 2020, 
https://www.fema.gov/emergency-managers/practitioners/integrated-public-alert-warning-system/public/
wireless-emergency-alerts. 
287 Federal Emergency Management Agency. 
288 Source: Federal Emergency Management Agency, 12. 
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Alert originators should work with functional and access needs advocacy groups 
and people who have additional barriers to effective warnings in the community to 
determine how assistive technologies might mesh with warning systems. As an example, 
NEMA has identified smart devices as a potential avenue through which the public might 
receive warnings.289 The Wireless Inclusive Rehabilitation Engineering Research Center 
at Georgia Tech also continues to research how technologies worn on the person might 
increase the effectiveness of warnings for individuals with functional and access needs, as 
such technologies could help to overcome barriers.290 Such research can serve as a guide 
for inclusive warning planning efforts.  
e. Promote Know-Your-Neighbor Programs 
The case studies and literature highlight the vulnerabilities of people with 
functional and access needs during disasters. James White discusses how these populations 
frequently have fewer personal connections, which can affect their disaster 
preparedness.291 Indeed, according to Jonathan Garner et al., “There is evidence that 
vulnerable members of society who received help from family, neighbors, and their 
community were more likely to avoid potentially fatal weather events, whereas those who 
were socially isolated were more likely to succumb.”292 New Zealand’s preparedness 
literature acknowledges the importance of such interpersonal affiliations within the context 
of information-sharing during disasters.293 New Zealand’s Get Ready website encourages 
citizens to “get to know [their] neighbors.”294 Due to this identified vulnerability and the 
power of neighborhood collaboration, emergency managers in the United States should 
 
289 National Emergency Management Association, “NEMA Wildfire Alert & Notification 
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encourage community preparedness through similar local programs. Such programs could 
have national and state emergency management support, and local agencies could tailor 
programs to fit the demographics of their communities, providing more social support for 
those who need it most in disasters. 
f. Regularly and Publicly Test Warning Systems 
The case studies and academic literature demonstrate the importance of regularly 
testing warning systems. Such tests benefit not only the general public but also those with 
functional and access needs. These tests complement inclusive outreach, education, and 
planning efforts, as disability advocacy groups can share information regarding tests with 
clients, and clients or caretakers can then ensure that accessible warning methods are in 
place in the home to meet the needs of a particular individual. Having an established means 
of coordinating with the public after such drills is important for gleaning information on 
potential warning improvements; the Department of Homeland Security supports this 
idea.295 
2. FEMA and the Department of Homeland Security Science and 
Technology Directorate 
The following recommendations incentivize local and state planning efforts and 
further research into resilient warning systems. The stakeholders for this area are those who 
can alter grant guidance and offer research awards. 
a. Incentivize Emergency Management Planning Functions with 
Vulnerable Populations through Federal Grant Funding 
In order to encourage alert originators to follow the previous recommendations, 
federal grant funding for emergency management should incentivize including vulnerable 
populations in the local and state emergency warning planning process. FEMA, as the 
administrator of numerous federal grant programs, should take the lead in this endeavor. A 
good candidate for such motivation is the Emergency Management Performance Grant, 
 
295 Department of Homeland Security, Public Safety Communications, 9. 
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which funds general emergency management activities in the United States.296 To 
effectively accomplish such an incentive, FEMA should work with state emergency 
management agencies and solicit their feedback. 
b. Conduct Further Research into Resilient Warning Infrastructure 
The recent wildfires and hurricane  illustrate just how vulnerable communications 
infrastructure currently is, despite advances in warning technology. More research is 
needed to bolster resiliency of warnings. The Department of Homeland Security Science 
and Technology Directorate should take the lead role in this endeavor, as the organization 
offers research funding for subjects pertaining to the homeland security enterprise, with 
one recent example focusing on COVID-19 technology.297 One promising technology is 
the Radio Broadcast Data Service. As the case studies demonstrate, cellular infrastructure 
in its current state is susceptible to damage from disasters, which is problematic for alerts 
and warnings. However, Radio Broadcast Data Service (RBDS) relies on a separate 
backbone to operate: FM radio.298 Thus, while recipients would still theoretically use the 
same devices (cellphones) to receive disaster-related information, a different set of 
infrastructure would send it to them. 
The Wireless Inclusive Rehabilitation Engineering Research Center (known as 
Wireless RERC) has advocated for this technology as a method by which to bolster the 
resiliency and inclusivity of warnings.299 Two studies, one from 2010 and one from 2014, 
have shown some promise for this technology, at least partially within the context of 
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functional and access needs message recipients.300 Due to the age of these studies and 
lingering communications disruptions in disasters, more investigation is warranted, 
especially with recent advancements in the Integrated Public Alerts and Warning System. 
Such technology would provide another avenue through which to warn the public, even in 
the face of cellular disruptions. The Wireless RERC explains, “A cell phone with FM radio 
and/or RBDS text capability provides another method for all citizens to receive emergency 
information in the event cell service is unavailable. . . . Future use of the FM radio chip with 
RBDS could add functionality to turn on the phone automatically and present the alert 
information.”301 Thus, it could actively grab the user’s attention. 
The Wireless RERC further posits that RBDS could provide numerous benefits for 
people with functional and access needs, as such technology can circumvent many of the 
shortcomings of the cellular-based Wireless Emergency Alerts and could theoretically 
integrate with assistive technologies.302 However, the Wireless RERC also recognizes that 
industry and technological hurdles exist for the implementation of this service, as 
envisioned.303 That said, FM technology may still prove beneficial to cellphone users, even if 
the vision of fully integrated RBDS does not come to pass. Indeed, some cellphones can receive 
FM broadcasts, albeit with less inclusivity and warning functionality. The FM chips that enable 
such reception have received a fair amount of coverage.  
The Wireless RERC also notes that FCC Chairman Ajit Pai has advocated for such 
technology.304 Indeed, in a striking 2017 press release, Pai strongly encourages Apple to 
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initiate FM technology within its cellphones.305 The National Academies of Sciences, 
Engineering, and Medicine have also recognized the potential of marrying such technology 
within cellular devices as a way to bolster the resiliency of warning infrastructure.306 This 
technology would act much like any other radio broadcast, as it could relay emergency or 
disaster information through regular and Emergency Alert System broadcasts if the user is 
actively listening. However, it would not actively grab users’ attention if they are not 
listening to the broadcast. 
Sam Matheny also highlights advantages of FM broadcast technology in a 
statement to Congress.307 However, Matheny also discusses another broadcast technology 
that warrants further study for inclusive warnings, known as NextGen TV. Matheny 
elaborates, “a Next Gen TV signal could wake up enabled devices and. . . . Using the rich-
media capabilities of Next Gen TV, broadcasters can provide targeted neighborhood-
specific alerts that include text, graphics (such as Doppler radar animations or an 
evacuation route), pictures, and even detailed video-on-demand descriptions.”308 
Furthermore, Matheny posits that this technology would continue to work even in the face 
of cell and power disruptions.309 Thus, this technology is viewed as being resilient and its 
multimedia content could hold numerous benefits for people with functional and access 
needs. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology Directorate 
plays an important role in researching technology for use within the homeland security 
realm, and could aid in bolstering research with the aforementioned broadcast 
methodologies for robust and inclusive warning systems. 
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B. LIMITATIONS 
This thesis was not meant to include an exhaustive examination of all the technical 
and human elements within the arena of effective warnings and alerts for people with 
functional and access needs; it merely scratched the surface. More research is needed to 
determine how best to serve these populations as technology continues to evolve. For 
example, research on RBDS and NextGen TV used in a complementary fashion with 
modern smartphones and Wireless Emergency Alerts would inform warning decision-
makers on the costs and benefits of such potentially resilient warning systems. 
Additionally, such research should incorporate feedback from functional and access needs 
advocacy groups and individuals on whether RDBS and NextGen TV bolstering Wireless 
Emergency Alerts more adequately meets their warning needs. 
Furthermore, the work of Chakraborty, Grineski, and Collins on the dangers posed 
to people with disabilities by Hurricane Harvey–related flooding around the Houston area 
is commendable; it would be illustrative for warning purposes to see if their findings 
generalize across the United States and all hazards.310 If people with functional and access 
needs generally live in more disaster-prone, higher-risk areas across the nation, this 
dynamic would strongly underscore the importance of inclusive, resilient, and redundant 
warning systems. While this thesis did not thoroughly examine such data, further 
investigation is warranted. 
C. CONCLUSION 
The United States has a moral obligation to serve those who are most vulnerable in 
disasters, beyond its statutory and policy requirements. Previous after-action reports and 
academic literature point to these communities suffering inordinately in the face of 
disasters. Improving warnings and notifications for people with functional and access 
needs will undoubtedly make the United Stated a more disaster-resilient nation. 
Those in public safety, emergency management, and homeland security must make 
accessible warnings a priority. Lives depend on it. As of this writing, massive wildfires are 
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again devastating the western United States and hurricanes are inundating the southern 
states. The year 2020 illustrated the need for effective warning systems. If current trends 
continue, there will be no shortage of hazards about which to warn the public. Investments 
of time, energy, and funding are vital in this arena, as such expenditures will pay dividends 
across all hazards and across all segments of the population, including the most vulnerable.  
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